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Notes and Comments
Counseling Draft Resistance: The Case
for a Good Faith Belief Defense*
To the young men of America, to the whole of the American
people, and to all men of good will everywhere:
1. An ever growing number of young American men are
finding that the American war in Vietnam so outrages their
deepest moral and religious sense that they cannot contribute
to it in any way. We share their moral outrage.
2. We further believe that the war is unconstitutional and
illegal.
4. We also believe it is an unconstitutional denial of reli-
gious liberty and equal protection of the laws to withhold
draft exemption from men whose religious or profound
philosophical beliefs are opposed to what in Western religious
tradition have been long known as unjust wars.
5. Therefore, we believe on all these grounds that every free
man has a legal right and a moral duty to exert every effort
to end this war, to avoid collusion with it, and to encourage
others to do the same. . . .Among those not in the armed
forces some are applying for status as conscientious objec-
tors to American aggression in Vietnam, some are refusing to
be inducted....
6. We believe that each of these forms of resistance against
illegitimate authority is courageous and justified.
-A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority
The Call to Resist was one of the "overt acts" which formed the
basis of the indictment 2 of Dr. Benjamin Spock, the Reverend William
* This Comment grew out of papers prepared for a seminar on Selective Service law
given by Professor John Grifiths, to whom the Law Journal is greatly indebted.
1. A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority, August 1967 [hereinafter cited as "Call
to Resist']. It was circulated on behalf of an organization called "Resist" by Noam
Chomsky, Rev. William S. Coffin, Jr., Dwight Macdonald, and Dr. Benjamin Spock;
it was signed by 373 professional people and published in Tilt NEw YORK Rrviaw or
BooKs, Oct. 12, 1967, at 7, and THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 1967, at 34.35. At the trial
of Dr. Spock and his co-defendants it was introduced into evidence by the Government
as Exhibit 1-b. Briefs for Appellants, Appendix, at 3338-39, United States v. Spock,
Nos. 7205-08 (1st Cir., July 11, 1969). [The twenty volumes of transcript, exhibits, and
court papers submitted by appellants in their appeal to the First Circuit are hereinafter
cited as Spock Appendix without volume number; the pagination is consecutive.]
2. Indictment, Crim. No. 68-1-F (D. Mass., Jan. 5, 1968), Spock Appendix 35.
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Sloane Coffin, Jr., Mitchell Goodman, Marcus Raskin, and Michael
Ferber for conspiring to counsel violation of the Selective Service law.3
After a five-week trial in the spring of 1968 before Judge Francis Ford
in Boston, a jury found all but Raskin guilty. The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, on July 11, 1969, reversed the four convictions,
but it found the "Call to Resist" to be in part "a call to unlawful
refusal to be drafted"4 and that endorsing its illegal purposes was the
basis of a conspiracy to counsel, aid, and abet violation of the draft
law.5 Although they had courted arrest,6 Dr. Spock and his co-defen-
dants had consistently asserted their belief in the legality as well as
the morality of the conduct they advised. 7 Their position thus differs
significantly from that form of civil disobedience in which a concededly
valid law is disobeyed in order to make a moral point. Furthermore,
the defendants in United States v. Spock were not primarily con-
cerned with challenging the constitutionality of the specific law which
they were charged with violating-the conspiracy and counseling pro-
visions of the draft statute." Rather, they sought a judicial test of the
3. The indictment also charged conspiring to "aid and abet" violation and to "hinder
and interfere" with the draft. Id. 31-32. This Comment will focus on the elements of
the counseling offense. Yet much of what is said applies to aiding and abetting. and
hindering and interfering as well, especially since in the Spock case, at least, these offenses
were charged to have been committed through public conduct which was largely symbolic
For example, the only "aid" which draft registrants seem to have received from the defen.
dants was in reporting their offense of nonpossession to the government. (The First Circuitheld this to be sufficient aiding and abetting because "[w]e do not think of Coffin as one
to run with the hare and hold with the hounds." United States v. Spook, Nos. 7205.08, at 22(1st Cir., July 11, 1969).)
4. United States v. Spock, Nos. 7205-08, at 18 (Ist Cir., July 11, 1959), citing Bond v.
Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
5. The court held that Dr. Spock must be acquitted because, while he was one of the
drafters of the "Call to Resist," he was not shown to have "adhere[d] to its illegal aspects."
Id. at 22. It found that Ferber, who did not sign the "Call," had not joined in the specific
illegal agreement that the Government had prosecuted. Coffin and Goodman were not
entitled to acquittals, but were given new trials because Judge Ford had improperly
accompanied the request for a general verdict with ten special questions. The court held
that this request abrogated "the full protection of a jury unfettered, directly or indirectly."
Id. at 29.
6. During a speech preceding the deposit of 253 draft cards at the Justice Department
on October 20, 1967, the Rev. Coffin said,
We hereby publicly counsel these young men to continue in their refusal to serve
in the armed forces as long as the war in Vietnam continues, and we pledge
ourselves to aid and abet them in all the ways we can. This means that if they are
now arrested for failing to comply with a law that violates their consciences, we
too must be arrested, for in the sight of that law we are now as guilty as they.
Defendants' Exhibit F, id. 3378. See also id. 780, 1336-37.
7. Defendant Coffin, for instance, believed that what he counseled was "an alleged
violation of the law." Id. 1618 (emphasis added). See also comments by Dr. Spack, Id.
2975-76. In addition, the "Call to Resist," which was signed by all defendants except
Ferber, exhibits its signers' belief that the draft imposes an "unconstitutional denial
of religious liberty" on registrants, that "every free man has a legal right" to avoid
collusion with the draft system and to "encourage others to do the same." The defen-
dants claimed to have used the statutory phrase "counsels, aids, or abets" only to drama-
tize the significance of the widespread opposition to the war and the draft on the
part of many young men, to whom they wished to give their moral support. Id. 2180-81.
8. But see "Call to Resist," id. 3339. "We firmly believe that our statement is the
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legality of the Vietnam war and the demands which the war and the
Selective Service System make on draft registrants.9
These defendants are only the most celebrated of a large number
of draft counselors who are leading the public debate on the draft
and consulting with registrants about their Selective Service status. As
counselors they may feel compelled to advise registrants to raise im-
portant constitutional objections to the requirements of Selective
Service law, as well as claims that the draft law has been improperly
applied in individual cases. In either situation, they give their advice
in the context of a law which purports to permit judicial review of the
System's determinations only at a registrant's criminal trial for re-
fusing to submit to induction.'0 Draft counselors, therefore, often find
themselves in the position of advising a registrant to "violate" the law
as the only way to raise what the counselors believe are legitimate ob-
jections to the registrant's treatment by the Selective Service System.
The Department of Justice took the position in the Spock case
that, whatever the beliefs that led them to counsel as they did, the
defendants were guilty of knowingly counseling illegal behavior
if their objections to the legitimacy of the war or the draft law and its
regulations are not ultimately upheld by the courts." This position,
however, misapplies the traditional rules relating to criminal intent
and ignores constitutional safeguards which protect even erroneous
sort of speech that under the First Amendment must be free, and that the actions we
will undertake are as legal as is the war resistance of the young men themselves." See
also id. 2229. In fact, the defendants stated that the "Call to Resist" was addressed to
persons over draft age to encourage them to lend their moral support to draft resisters
and that they never "advised" or "counseled" anyone to disobey a Selective Service duty
but only supported those who, as a matter of conscience, had already decided to resist.
Id. 1234-35, 1336, 1606-07, 1625, 2196-97, 2230, 2872, 2908.
9. Id. 1605, 1607.
10. Section 10(b)(3) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 App. U.S.C.
§ 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1968), provides:
...No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any regis.
trant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense to a
criminal prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title, after the registrant
has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for indtuction,
or for civilian work in the case of a registrant determined to be opposed to participa.
tion in war in any form: Provided, That such review shall go to the question of the
jurisdiction herein reserved to local boards, appeal boards, and the President only
when there is no basis in fact for the classification assigned to such registrant....
But see Oestereich v. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968) (Section 10(b)(3) not applicable
to certain statutory exemptions).
11. The Justice Department urged affirmance of District Judge Francis Ford's
instructions that a good faith effort to test a law does not excuse a violation if the law Is
held to be valid. Brief for Appellee at 69, United States v. Spock, Nos. 7205-08 (1st Cir.
July 11, 1969). Judge Ford denied defendants' proposed instructions on this point. E. .,
Spock Appendix 202-05, 306-08, 336-39, 359. Instead, he gave the charge requested by thre
prosecution, which was nearly identical to that disapproved by the Supreme Court In
Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1945). Spock Appendix 3226-27. See United States v.
Spock, Nos. 7205-08, at n.29 (Ist Cir., July 11, 1969) (question left unresolved).
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statements. To the charge of counseling violations of the Selective
Service law there should be a defense of "good faith belief": defen-
dants should be excused if they sincerely believed that the conduct
which they counseled either was legal under the Selective Service law
or was constitutionally protected despite the apparent commands of
the Act.'
This Comment will show that the good faith belief defense may be
derived from the rules of criminal intent and that this result is sup-
ported and further compelled by constitutional considerations of
vagueness and free speech, by the demands of the right to counsel,
and by emanations of the recent "right to litigate" cases.
I. The Statute
The statutory basis of prosecutions for counseling draft resistance
is Section 12(a) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967:
[A]ny person... who knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another to
refuse or evade registration or service in the armed forces or any
of the requirements of this title, or of said rules, regulations, or
directions, ... or who conspires to commit any one or more of
such offenses, shall . . . be punished by imprisonment for not
more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by
both .... 13
Judicial interpretation of the statute has for the most part declined
opportunities to restrict its sweep; instead the federal courts have ex-
tended the reach of the counseling provision well beyond the limits
suggested by its common law and statutory background.
A. The Background of "Counseling"
At common law, "counseling" referred to two different criminal sta-
tuses: accessories before the fact and solicitors.14 Accessories before the
fact, like aiders and abettors, were accomplices to a completed crimel'
and were punished as harshly as the principals.10 But stringent require-
12. This Comment will consider only belief that conduct is legally justified. On the
continuity between legal and moral beliefs, see Dworkin, On Not Prosecuting Civil Dis-
obedience, N.Y. REv. OF Boors, June 6, 1968, at 14. The phrase "good faith belief' is
redundant, but it will be used for emphasis.
13. 50 App. U.S.C. § 462(a) (Supp. I, 1968) (emphasis added).
14. 2 J. STrHEN, A HIsroRy OF THE CrsaMiNAL LAw OF ENGLAND 229-30 (188; G.
WumLuzs, CmumNAL LAw, THE GENERAL PART 362, 612 (2d ed. 1961).
15. 2 J. STEPHN, HIsTORY, supra note 14, at 231. G. WLuIxs, supra note 14, at 362.
16. 4 BLAcrsroNE, CoiEt.,mAr.As 039; 2 J. STrrm, MHsroaY, supra note 14, at 231.
The federal rule has abolished the largely verbal distinction between "principal" and
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ments of proof had to be met to convict a counselor as an accessory. Not
only did speech counseling a crime have to be followed by commission
of the crime counseled,' 7 but the counsel had to be specific-not, say,
advocacy of the merits of burglary as a career.18 Thus, a close causal
link between counsel and action was necessary.19 Furthermore, a
counselor was liable only for conduct he might fairly be said to have
authorized, not for acts committed in consequence of his counsel but
beyond what he recommended.20 As an accessory before the fact, the
counselor was also protected by an intent standard which required that
an accomplice know all the material facts constituting the principal
crime, "even if the crime counseled was one of strict liability."
2
'
Long after the category of accessory before the fact was incorporated
into the common law,22 counseling which did not result in a completed
crime became the misdemeanor of solicitation,23 over objections that
punishing such speech was like punishing "mere intent."24 The crime
was complete with the utterance of guilty speech; no effect had to
follow, or even be probable.2 5
"accessory" (which, indeed, was recognized only for felonies at common law) and declared
that accessories before the fact and aiders and abettors are all to be called, as well as
punished as, principals. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
17. The early rule actually required conviction of the principal perpetrator before
conviction of the accomplice. 2 J. STEPHEN, HISroRY, supra note 14, at 232, 235-36. It was
modified by 24 & 25 Vict. 94, §§ 1 & 2 (1861).
18. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 365-66.
19. The commentators who have discussed the need for proof of cause in fact where
there has been counsel and then crime suggest that it should be required, though the issue
has seldom arisen. See, e.g., 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 265, at 339-41 (l1th ed. 1912);
H.L.A. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 357 (1959) (quoting J. Stephen), G.
WILLmmS, supra note 14, at 381-83; cf. State v. King, 104 Iowa 727, 74 N.W. 691 (1898)
(instigating effect on another necessary to show agreement in conspiracy).
20. A counselor would be liable for a mistake or miscarriage in following his advice,
3. STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIaINAL LAW 34-35 (1894); or for conduct fairly Included
in the enterprise suggested, M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 617 (Wilson
ed. 1778); G. WILLIAms, supra note 14, at 401-03. But he apparently would not be liable
if he counseled murder of A and the means he suggested were used to murder B Instead.
Regina v. Saunders & Archer, 2 Plowd. 473, 75 Eng. Rep. 706 (1575). Nor If he counseled
mere theft would he be liable for a burglary. M. HALE, supra, at 616-17, G. WILLIAsIS,
supra, at 401-02.
21. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 394; cf. National Coal Board v. Gamble, 8 All. ER.
203, 209 (Q.B. 1958).
22. The law of accomplices, even by Learned Hand's standards, "goes back a long way"
-to the beginning of the fourteenth century, at least. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d
401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938), citing 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
507 (1st ed. 1895). Solicitation was not fully established until 1801. See authorities cited
note 24 infra.
23. Regina v. Gregory, L.R. 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 77 (1867); 2 J. STEPHEN, HIlsroRY, supra
note 14, at 230; 1 J. BISHOP, NEw COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 409 (1892). Solicita-
tion to treason, which was itself treason, and solicitation to mutiny were punishable by
death. J. STEPHEN, DIGEST, supra note 20, at 44-45, 47-48.
24. Rex v. Higgins, 2 East 5, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (1801), repudiating Regina v. Danlell, 6
Mod. 99, 87 Eng. Rep. 856 (1704); see Curran, Solicitation: A Substantive Crime, 17 MINN. L.
REv. 499, 504-05 (1933); Blackburn, Solicitation to Crimes, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 185 (1934).
25. Regina v. Most, 7 Q.B.D. 244 (1881); Regina v. Gregory, L.R. 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 77
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"Counseling" in federal law is outlaved primarily in its accessorial
sense.26 The federal aiding and abetting statute provides that "[w]ho-
ever directly commits any act constituting an offense defined in any
law of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces
or procures its commission is a principal."27 This provision has been
interpreted to follow the common law definition and reach only ac-
complices in completed crimes.28 In one respect, American courts have
narrowed the criminal liability of accomplices. The trend in federal
courts is to require, not only knowledge of facts material to the prin-
cipal offense, but a conscious purpose (sometimes labeled a "specific
intent") to further the illegal endeavor.2
The few federal solicitation laws are identified by distinctive wording
which makes plain their intent to reach even counsel which has not
been effective.30 Though solicitation law is not extensive, its history
has been explosive. While accessory provisions have not raised con-
stitutional problems, state and federal solicitation laws are a staple of
first amendment litigation.31 The reasons are obvious. Solicitation
prosecutions involve substantial guesswork about the potential effects
of words. The "danger" and "value" of the speech in such cases must
be analyzed abstractly, with only a general context and general prin-
ciples as guides,32 while accessory prosecutions, by contrast, start with
completed crimes.
(1867); Commonwealth v. Flagg, 135 Mass. 545 (1883); State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432.
121 A. 805 (1923); Regina v. Krause, 66 J.P. 121 (190 9 ).
26. The notable exceptions are solicitation to various forms of disloyalty, prohibited by18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387, 2388 (1964). See text infra.
27. 1S U.S.C. § 2(a) (1954).
28. United States v. Horton, 180 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1950); Karrell v. United States, 181F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1950); cf. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 450 (1949) (concurring
opinion). This rule has been applied to specific provisions in other federal statutes. E.g.,United States v. Mills, 32 U.S. 138 (1833) (post office offenses); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 752 (1954)(escape of federal prisoners).
29. E.g., United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938) (L Hand, J.); AMorei v.United States, 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942); Robinson v. United States, 262 F.2d 6415 (9th Cir.1959). Contra, Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1940). The Peoni rulehas been cited with approval by the Supreme Court, Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336U.S. 613, 619 (1949), and, after controversy, adopted by the Model Penal Code. MoDELPENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see Wedhslcr, Jones & Korn. The
Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute:
Attempt, Solicitation, - Conspiracy, II, 61 COLUM. L Rrv. 957, 968-71 (1961).
30. Eg., 18 U.S.C. § 2387 (1964): "advises, counsels, urges, or in any manner causes or
attempts to cause ...."
31. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 37 U.S.L.W. 4525 (US., June 9, 1969), overruling
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Dennis v. United States, 341 US. 494 (1951);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v.United States, 250 US. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
32. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), epitomizes the approach and its hazards.
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B. Legislative History
The Selective Service Act of 1917 had no specific counseling pro-
visions.3 The present counseling provision first appeared in the 1940
Act. 4 There are three strong indications that it was intended to be
an accessory law only: (1) the phrasing of the section, "knowingly
counsels, aids, or abets," suggests it is an accessory provision since "aid
and abet" refers only to accomplices;3 5 (2) its source was the federal
aider and abettor statute 3 6 which applies to counselors only if they
are accessories; 37 and (3) Congress, in drafting the counseling pro-
vision, gave no independent indication that the provision was in-
tended to create a new offense-the legislators apparently thought
they were merely codifying past practice.38
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Act suggests that by pro-
hibiting only "knowing" counsel Congress intended to recognize
constitutional protections and limit the reach of the counseling pro-
vision. The first draft of the 1940 Act, introduced into the Senate on
June 20th and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs for hear-
ings, enlarged on the 1917 Act by providing for punishment of "any
person . . . who counsels, aids, or abets another to evade registration
or service or any [other] requirements . . . ."9 After numerous objec-
tions to the sweep of the penalty provisions were raised during the
hearings, 40 "knowingly" was added before the definitions of four
33. It directly punished only those who "evade[d] or aid[edl another to evade the
requirements of this Act or of [its] regulations." Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 6, 40 Stat. 81.
34. Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 11, 54 Stat. 894.
35. Cf. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 US. 262 (1963); Krulewltch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 450 (1949) (concurring opinion). Solicitation statutes, moreover, usually
make it explicit that counsel need not have been effective. See, e.g., note 30 supra; 24 & 25
Vict., c. 100, § 4 (1861) ("solicit, encourage, persuade, or endeavour to persuade, or
propose to [another]').
36. See note 38 infra.
37. See p. 1013 supra.
38. According to the only legislative history of Section 11, it "contains the penalty
provisions of the bill, which are substantially the same as those of the World War Act.
Experience with the World War provisions shows that they worked satisfactorily In
providing the necessary protection." 86 CoNG. REC. 10095 (1940). This remark, by Senator
Morris Sheppard, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, was quite
reasonably made the basis for an interpretation by the Supreme Court that the penalty
clause "was designed to catalogue the various offenses against the Act." Singer v. United
States, 323 U.S. 338, 343, 348-49 (1945); cf. SEiL SERv. L. REP. PRacrict; MANUAL 2602 (1968).
But see Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 344 (1945). See also id. at 348-49 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
39. Hearings on S. 4164 Before the Senate Comm. on Military Affairs, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1940).
40. Objection to the enforcement provisions of the original bill was voiced mainly
by representatives of religious groups appearing before the Senate Military Affairs
Committee to testify concerning the problem of the conscientious objector. The
contention of this group, as evidenced by their testimony, was that anyone engaged
in religious work who might counsel a conscientious objector subject to induction
1014
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criminal acts.41 While the Senate apparently thought this explicit pro-
tection of counselors unnecessary, witnesses at the House hearings on
the bill were less sanguine. Robert Handschin of the National Farmers'
Union expressed the sentiments of many:
The loose language of section 10 of the bill would allow no
criticism in any form whatsoever, direct or indirect, of this law,
while it was on the statute books, outside of the Congress. We
contend that such military dictatorship could become the great-
est threat to civil liberties in this country that we have ever
seen-not barring the unfortunate experiences which took place
between 1917 and 1920.
We believe the fullest guarantees should be given for allow-
ing the citizens of this country to question at all times the policies,
both of Congress and of the defense officers entrusted by the
citizens with the task of defending the country, so long as the use
of such civil liberties does not directly violate the actual work-
ings of our defense laws.42
under the act to follow the dictates of his own conscience in deciding whether to
refuse military service might be liable to fine and imprisonment under the pending
legislation.
2 SEr.Erivar SmVxCE Ssmr, THE SELECrIVE SERVICE Acr 668 (Special Monograph No. 2.
1954) [hereinafter cited as SELECTIVE SERVICE MONOGR"AH No. 2].
The following are illustrative of the attitudes of these religious and civil liberties leaders:
Section 10 of this bill does more than hint at doing away with free speech, free
press, free assembly, even free conscience. Anyone who counsels, aids, or abets another
in evading conscription is liable to fine and imprisonment.
Certainly as editor of a paper which has been in existence for 8 )-ears, I look with
grave apprehension at this denial of our natural rights. If we feel obliged in
conscience to oppose and continue to oppose what we consider to be an unjust, un-
American, and tyrannic law, then we are in danger of having our work wiped out,
of imprisonment and fine.
Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 154-55 (testimony of Miss Dorothy Day, Editor of the
Catholic Worker).
Our ministers who by our church law have the right to counsel with conscientious
objectors and to give them the spiritual existence of the church are guilty under the
provisions of this bill, for they may easily be construed by a hostile administration as
one "who counsels, aids, or abets another to evade registration or service in the land
and naval forces" under the provisions of this act.
Id. 262 (testimony of Rev. John M. Swomley, Jr., of the National Council of ,Methodist
Youth).
41. SELrCrW SERVICE MONOcPAPH No. 2, at 669-72.
42. Hearings on HR. 10132 Before the House Comm. on Military Affairs, 76th ong.,
3d Sess. 283 (1940). One witness proved a better prophet than Senator May Chainan of the
House Committee, of the difficulties which the section would present
Miss D=ZER. Finally, I want to mention this section 10 in the bill under article
X, and which I do not understand, and I wonder how it will be interpreted, and that
is the part which states, "Whoever counsels, aids, or abets the registration." Now,
how is it going to be decided what counsels, aids, or abets? If I make a speech against
war, will it be counseling, aiding, or abetting? If I write a pamphlet, what does that
mean? Who is going to make the decision? What about a mother who counsels her
son or aids him in not registering? What does that provision mean as to the penalty
of 5 years.
I do not want to see you start abridging free speech in peacetime. There is no
end to where it may go.
I think for the sake of democracy opposition is vitally important. If there had been
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To overcome these objections, the House Committee added "know-
ingly" in five places, 43 among them before the "counsels, aids, or
abets" clause.44 The Conference Committee combined the Senate and
House additions of "knowingly, '45 and in the final bill, which was
enacted on September 16, 1940, "knowingly" appeared in six places.
40
The Selective Service System has interpreted the addition of "know-
ingly" to mean "that the actions of an individual charged with violat-
ing the law were in themselves not sufficient evidence; it had to be
shown that he performed the act knowingly, that is deliberately or
wilfully."47 In all subsequent re-enactments of the Selective Service
law, the requirement that counseling be done "knowingly" has re-
mained unchanged.48
C. Judicial Interpretation
There are only a few reported cases interpreting the draft law's
counseling provision.49 For the most part, the courts have increased
no opposition, probably they would still have Chamberlain and what would have
happened no one knows. The minute you abridge free speech you abridge opposi-
tion, and that is what is underneath. That section should be stricken out from ths bill.
The CHAIRMAN. That is a statute which provides for dealing with persons who
obstruct this program in violation of the law when it is enacted.
For instance, when I am sitting on my front porch down in Kentucky and my
neighbor boy comes in from out of the creek in the Kentucky mountains and says
something to me, "I have been called to the Army." I say, "Go hide in a cave in the
cliff." Then I am guilty of violating the law.
Miss D=-ZER. Just exactly as Mr. [Harry Emerson] Fosdick may be, only he has
raised the question how it may be done. How are you going to know by what counsels,
aids, and abettings? That may be anything.
The CHAIRMAN. Those terms are well defined.
Miss DETmER. I know they are legal terms, but you can stretch any law.
The CHAIRMAN. You can stretch any law, but nobody can stretch this one. It will be
enforced by the courts.
Id. 377.
43. "The influence of such testimony on the executive deliberations of the House
committee becomes apparent after a glance at the section as reported out of the com-
mittee." SELECTIVE SERVICE MONOGRAPH No. 2, at 674.
44. Id. 676.
45. Id. 681-83.
46. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885, 894-95.
47. SFLECTIvE SERVICE SYSTEM, ENFORCEMENT OF THE SELECTIvE SERVICE LAW 20 (Special
Monograph No. 14, 1950).
48. 50 App. U.S.C. § 462(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. III, 1968).
49. Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1945); Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38
(6th Cir. 1949), afi'd by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 857 (1950); Warren v. United
States, 177 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947 (1950); Okamoto v. United
States, 152 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1945); Butler v. United States, 138 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1943);
Baxley v. United States, 184 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1943); United States v. Coffman, 50 F. Stpp.
823 (S.D. Cal. 1943). Keegan and Okamoto are discussed in the following section. Butler and
Coffman were not centrally concerned with the draft law's counseling provision; the
former focused mainly on the other count of the indictment, which was drawn under the
counseling section of the Espionage Act, now 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1964), and the latter dealt
primarily with a scope-of-search question and commented on the substantive charge only
to say: "The wilfullness required of one who counsels, aids and abets another to evade
1016
Vol. 78: 1008, 1969
Counseling Draft Resistance
the statute's reach by abandoning the limits which its background sug-
gests are appropriate. In Baxley v. United Statesr0 a World W%,ar II
counseling prosecution, the Fourth Circuit defined "counsel" broadly,
going beyond the natural sense of the word as well as previous attempts
to restrict its scope.51 The court declared, "It is not even essential that
Baxley should have directly and expressly urged his hearers to evade
service or registration, if such evasion was the normal and natural
consequence of his words to those who heard and believed them."02
The two most recent cases under the counseling provision departed
entirely from the most basic limitation on conviction as an accessory;
to convict a counselor under the draft law the government apparently
no longer need show that his speech led to a completed substan-
tive violation. In Warren v. United StatesO the Tenth Circuit upheld
a stepfather's conviction for counseling draft evasion, even though his
stepson had rejected the advice that he not register. In Gara v. United
States,54 a college dean was convicted for telling a student who was
about to be arrested for failing to register, "Don't let them coerce
service in the land and naval forces of the United States is not a general ideological oppo i-
tion to war.. . but the evil design to do the particular act denounced by Section 311.
Title 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix [now 50 App. U.S.C. § 462(a) (Supp. Ill, 1965)]." 50 F. Supp.
at 826.
50. 134 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1943).
51. "Counsel" has seldom been explicated. Learned Hand's offering in Mases Pub.
Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). is perhaps
the best.
To counsel or advise a man to an act is to urge upon him either that it is his interest
or his duty to do it. While, of course, this may be accomplished as well by indirect-
tion as expressly, since words carry the meaning that they impart, the definition is
exhaustive, I think, and I shall use it. Political agitation, by the passions it arouses
or the convictions it engenders, may in fact stimulate men to the violation of law.
Detestation of existing policies is easily transformed into forcible resistance of the
authority which puts them in execution, and it would be folly to disregard the
causal relation between the two. Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with
direct incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods ofpolitical agitation which in normal times is a safeguard of free government.
244 F. at 540. But cf. F. WHARTON, CRiMiNAL LAW §§ 265-66 (12th ed. J. Ruppenthal 1932).
Judge Hand could have cited Stephen for support:
Suppose, for instance, A tells B of facts which operate as a motive to B for the murder
of C. It would be an abuse of language to say that A had killed C, though no doubthe had been the remote cause of C's death.... In Othello's case, for instance, I am
inclined to think that lago could not have been convicted as accessory before thefact to Desdemona's murder, but for the single remark: "Do it not with poison,
strangle her in her bed."
5 J. STrPH.N, HISTORY, supra note 14, at 8.
52. 134 F.2d at 938-39. This standard would encompass speech dearly protected by thefirst amendment as well, if there is any truth in Holmes's aphorism "Every idea is anincitement." Gitlow v. New York, 268 US. 652, 673 (1925) (dissenting opinion); see. e.g.,Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312-27 (1957). The court also rejected Baxleys claim
that since he was a devout Jehovah's Witness preaching his religious beliefs he should beprotected by the free exercise clause. If speech or conduct opposed to the draft were
recognized as religious expression, it would then merit constitutional protection, subject
only to a sincerity test. Cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
53. 177 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947 (1950).
54. 178 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 857 (1950).
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you into registering." There was evidence of a completed crime in
Gara, though the Sixth Circuit, in upholding the conviction, said
there need not have been.55 This was probably not mere dictum, since
there was no evidence that Dean Gara's advice had in any way
prompted the student's conduct, and it is therefore doubtful that all
the elements of an accessorial offense had been made out.0 In effect,
judicial interpretation has both changed the counseling prohibition
from an accessory to a solicitation law and severely lowered the test
for a solicitation. 57
55. 178 F.2d at 40. The court took it as settled law that "where an attempt to
obstruct military service, as well as actual obstruction, is penalized by statute, there Is
'no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime,' citing Schenck
v. United States, 294 U.S. 47 (1919). But while the statute involved in Schench makes
it a crime to obstruct or attempt to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the
United States, 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1964), to assert that the counseling provision punishes
attempts is to assume what has to be proved.
56. See note 19 supra. The court declared that Dean Gara's advice had affected the
registrant's decision because, although the registrant had initially violated the act two
months before the Dean's statement to him (i.e., on the date he first became liable to
register but refused to do so), he committed another crime every day by continuing to
refuse; in speaking to the registrant on the day he was arrested, Dean Gara "encouraged"
the registrant not to register thereafter. 178 F.2d at 40.
57. Interpretation of the draft law's conspiracy provisions has followed the permissive
trend of the draft counseling cases.
Prior to 1940, conspiracy charges had to be brought under Section 4 of the
Espionage Act, now 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1964), or under one of the two general federal
conspiracy laws. Section 37 of the Criminal Code, now 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964), punishes
conspiracies "to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United
States, or any agency thereof .... " Secton 6 of the Criminal Code, now 18 U.S.C. § 2384
(1964), punishes conspiracies "by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any
law of the United States." Cases applying these provisions to the draft law are Ruthenberg
v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918);
Fraina v. United States, 255 F. 28 (2d Cir. 1918); Reeder v. United States, 262 F. A6 (8th
Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 252 U.S. 581 (1920). But see Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795,
799 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 689 (1921).
The conspiracy provision added to the draft law in the Selective Service and Training
Act of 1940 reached "any person or persons who shall knowingly hinder or interfere in
any way by force or violence with the administration of this Act or the rules or regula-
tions made pursuant thereto, or conspires to do so." Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 11, 54
Stat. 895 (emphasis added). In Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 340 (1945), the Supreme
Court declined to limit this provision to conspiracies to hinder or interfere by force or
violence, which would have made it substantially an incorporation of Section 6 of the CrIn-
inal Code. Instead, it held that "or conspires to do so" reached conspiracies to violate any part
of the penalty provision. In 1948 the Act was amended and the words "or conspires 
to do so"
changed to the present wording, "who conspires to commit any one or more of such
offences," in order to "incorporate judicial determinations made pursuant to the 11940J
Act." S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1948); see 50 App. U.S.C. § 462(a) (Supp.
III, 1968).
While this extension of the draft law's conspiracy provision did not reach conspiracies
which had previously been legal, it did have the indirect effect of relaxing tie standards
of proof in conspiracy cases, standards which were already very low. Goldstein, Conspiracy
to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 406 (1959); Krulewitch v. United States, 836
U.S. 440, 446-48 (1949) (concurring opinion). Section 37 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.
§ 371, required proof of an "overt act" to effect the object of the conspiracy; in Singer,
however, the Court held that the draft law punished conspiracies "on a common law
footing," and that proof of an overt act was, therefore, not required. 323 U.S. at 840
(1945). The elements of conspiracy under the draft law are thus entirely mental-an
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II. Keegan v. United States and the Good Faith Belief Defense
In Keegan v. United States65 the Supreme Court made the major
judicial effort to limit the scope of the Selective Service Act's coun-
seling provision. The Court's solution to some of the problems of the
Act is a tentative step toward recognition of the good faith belief de-
fense as a necessary safeguard for draft counselors.
The defendants in Keegan were officers of the German-American
Bund prior to and during World War II. They had lobbied in Con-
gress against Section 8(i) of the 1940 draft act, 9 which declared it the
policy of Congress that Bund members should not be hired to fill job
vacancies created by the induction of other workers. When Section
8(i) was enacted, the defendants in Keegan declared that it was un-
constitutional and that conscription could not, therefore, be constitu-
tionally imposed upon Bund members: "No Civil Rights-No
Military Duty! Draft Exempts Bund Membersl"6 0 In "Command No.
37" the Bund ordered its members to register for the draft but to re-
fuse military service until a determination had been made of the
constitutionality of Section 8(i) and announced that they were plan-
ning to bring a "test case" to vindicate the rights of Bund members.6
"act" of agreement and a guilty plan or intention. See Developments in the Law-Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REV. 920, 925-56 (1959); Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy. 89
U. PA. L. REv. 624 (1941). See also United States v. Spock, Nos. 7205-03 (lst Cir., July 11,
1969), in which the bulk of the opinion is concerned with specific intent, which the court
found required by Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
When the alleged agreement is both bifarious and political within the shadow of the
First Amendment, we hold that an individual's specific intent to adhere to the illegal
portions may be shown in one of three ways: by the individual defendant's prior or
subsequent unambiguous statements; by the individual defendant's subsequent com-
mission of the very illegal act contemplated by the agreement; or by the individual
defendant's subsequent legal act if that act is "dearly undertaken for the specific
purpose of rendering effective the later illegal activity whid is advocated." [Citing
Scales at 234.]
United States v. Spock, supra, at 11-12.
58. 325 U.S. 478 (1945).
59. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 8(i), 54 Stat. 892:
It is the expressed policy of the Congress that whenever a vacancy is caused in tie
employment rolls of any business or industry by reason of induction into the service
of the United States of an employee pursuant to the provisions of this Act such
vacancy shall not be filled by any person who is a member of the Communist Party
or the German-American Bund.
60. Quoted, 325 U.S. at 497 (concurring opinion).
61. Bund Command No. 37, quoted in 325 U.S. at 484-85:
4. Military Service: On October 16, of this year, all citizens and non-citizens (male)
who are of age, but who have not passed their 26th year, must register with the
military authorities. This order must be complied with unhesitatingly.
We represent the standpoint, however, that AN INDUCTION into the MILITARY
SERVICE is NOT justified, in as far it concerns Bund members and American
Germans, for in the Selective Service Law the citizenship rights of Bund members and
the defenders of Germandom are unconstitutionally severed!
EVERY MAN, if he can, will REFUSE to, do military duty until this law and all
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There was, however, evidence that even prior to the addition of Sec-
tion 8(i) to the Selective Service bill, the Bund, although favoring
compulsory service, "feared that the President might use a conscript
army by sending it abroad to fight with England, against Germany."
0 2
Bund leaders had also indicated that they would refuse to fight in such
a war.
03
Keegan and other Bund officers were charged with conspiring to
counsel Bund members, in the words of the 1940 statute, "to evade
registration or service" in the military.0 4 At trial, they asserted as a
defense their good faith belief that the actions which they had coun-
seled were legal-that Bund members, unconstitutionally discrimi-
nated against by Section 8(i), were not obligated to serve under the
draft law. The trial judge instructed the jury that the defendants'
good faith belief that the law was not binding upon those whom
they counseled was no defense under the law, and the jury found
them guilty.
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, reversed the conviction. Justice
Roberts, announcing the judgment of the Court in an opinion in
which Justices Frankfurter and Murphy concurred, found that the
Command did not "in itself" amount to counseling, even taking ac-
count of the defendants' disapproving attitude toward American
participation in the war and their statements to that effect.0r A sub-
stantial part of Justice Roberts's opinion and most of Chief Justice
Stone's dissent analyze the meaning of the word "evade" in the pro-
hibition of knowing counsel "to evade registration or service." The
opinions differ as to whether the Bund command counseled "evasion"
or "merely refusal" which "is not made criminal by the Act," and
the dissent seems to have the better of the dispute.00 If the distinction
other laws of the country or the states which confine the citizenship rights of Bund
members ARE REVOKEDI
We will fight to establish a precedent in this servile matter! [Emphasis in originl.]
62. 325 U.S. at 483.
63. "The witness stated that he said to Belohlavek: 'Joe, you are in the draft aren't
you? He said, "Yes." I said, "What are you going to do if they send you to the other side?"
So he said, "Well"-it was a vulgar word--"I will run to the other side and fight against
them".'" 325 U.S. at 489. See also Statements of defendants Keegan and Klapprott, ad. at
489-90.
64. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 11, 54 5tat. 895.
65. 325 U.S. at 494-95.
66. Justice Roberts argued that "evade" encompassed only fraudulent and secret
schemes to elude a recognized obligation. Chief Justice Stone thought it reached all
failures to register or serve when required to do so. As the Chief Justice pointed out,
the distinction is unclear. The Latin root of "evade", means "avoid," 325 U.S. at 501.02,
and the term seems broad enough to cover any failure to perform a required duty. And
Justice Roberts could not really be suggesting that any counseling of refusal is legal. For
instance, counsel to refuse an order to report for induction is not legal in anyone's view
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between evasion and refusal were the sole ground for the decision,
Keegan would now be obsolete, for in 1948 Congress amended the
draft law to make it illegal to counsel "refusal" as well as "evasion" of
any duty under the Act. 7 But Justice Roberts's opinion is not restricted
to the evade-refuse issue. The Government's conspiracy charge also
rested on "a sinister and undisclosed intent," in connection with Com-
mand No. 37, to counsel evasion.68 The meager evidence of this intent
was undercut, according to Justice Roberts, by the defendants' belief
that the Act was unconstitutional, even though that belief was er-
roneous, and his language seems to go further than necessary to defeat
the conspiracy charge:
One with innocent motives, who honestly believes a law is un-
constitutional and, therefore, not obligatory, may well counsel
that the law shall not be obeyed; that its command shall be re-
sisted until a court shall have held it valid, but this is not know-
ingly counselling, stealthily and by guile, to evade its command.09
In his concurrence, Justice Black pursued this theme; he examined the
basis for defendants' beliefs about the Act at length in order "to dis-
tinguish between honest objections directed at legitimate wrongs, and
sham protests which only obscure the real purpose."7 0 His interest in
the constitutional arguments made by the defendants clearly went
to whether they were honestly believed as well as to whether they
were correct.71
At the heart of Justice Roberts's opinion is a declaration of the
importance of the defendants' "honesty and bona fides" in their belief
about the legality of their conduct.72 But neither Justice Roberts nor
if there is no claim of exemption but if, instead, the counselor wants to obstruct the
operation of the system or decides that refusal to comply with the law is justified on
general principle. On the other hand, the addition of "refuse" to the provision only
creates confusion since registrants are entitled, now as in 1945, to refuse illegal demands
to serve, and counselors may so advise them. See p. 1028 infra.
67. 50 App. US.C. § 462(a) (Supp. III, 1968). The provision as amended in 1948 is
still in force, substantially unchanged.
68. 325 US. at 488.
69. Id. at 493-94. Justice Roberts suggested that reasonableness of belief was irrelevant:
"The belief that validity of the other provisions of the Act depends on the validity of [Sec-
tion 8(i)] may seem foolish to us, but can we say that the other defendants did not believe
what the Bund's lawyer told them about that?" Id. at 487.
70. Id. at 496 (Black, J., concurring).
71. Because he joined Justice Roberts in finding that defendants' beliefs made the evi-
dence insufficient to support convictions, he was "not compelled to pass on this grave
constitutional challenge [the invalidity of the Act due to Section 8(o]." Id. at 495 (Black,
J., concurring).
72. Id. at 493. On the matter of belief, the trial judge had instructed the jury that
"if there was a conspiracy amongst these defendants, or any of them, having as its object
the violation of the Selective Service Law, knowingly, the reason for such violation is im-
material to you in your consideration of the question of their guilt or innocence." Id.
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Justice Black was careful to distinguish what was relevant to a charge
of counseling, or even attempting to counsel, from what was relevant
to conspiracy.73 Dictum and holding seem to be inextricably inter-
twined. In any event, Justice Roberts was unable to convince a ma-
jority of the Court that only those who intend to achieve an end they
know to be illegal come within the counseling prohibition. Justice
Rutledge cast the decisive vote on the additional theory that the
speech involved was "sheer political discussion.
74
III. Mens Rea in the Crime of Counseling
While Justices Roberts and Black were impressed by the good
faith of the defendants in Keegan, they failed to explain fully the
reasons they found it relevant. The majority did not reach the obvious
starting place for an argument that the defendants' conduct should
be excused because of their beliefs; the doctrine of mens rea responds
to the concern that innocent commission of crime should not be pun-
ished, and it provides a foundation for a good faith belief defense
to a charge of counseling draft offenses.
A. The Theory
The requirement of mens rea, the Supreme Court has declared,
"is no provincial or transient notion. . . . It is as universal and per-
(emphasis in original). The Court was unhappy with this formulation: "Here the honesty
and bona fides of the defendants is said to be immaterial; the fact that they desired to
test the constitutionality of the law is said to be immaterial." Id. The Supreme Court's
conclusion suggests that counsel cannot be knowing when it is done in the belief that
those counseled had bona fide grounds to object to their treatment by the Selective
Service System which would justify their noncompliance with the provisions of the Act.
This view of Keegan has been taken in the circuits. The most important such decision
is Okamoto v. United States, 152 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1945), which involved Japanese.
Americans who were relocated during World War II from the Pacific coast to a Heart
Mountain, Wyoming, detention camp. They protested their relocation by conspiring to
counsel registrants in their number against going to the induction center as ordered.
In reversing their convictions, the Tenth Circuit explicitly recognized "the right of one
to counsel in good faith and with innocent motives non-compliance with a law honestly
believed to be unconstitutional and for that reason not obligatory." Id. at 908. The
Eighth Circuit gave Keegan a similar reading, but distinguished it and Ohanloto In
Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960) (affirming conviction for trespassing
on defense installation after warning that the conduct was illegal).
73. Neither opinion refers to the argument made by defendants and rebutted in the
dissent that conspiracy requires a particular sort of "corrupt" intent. Consolidated brief of
all petitioners represented by assigned counsel 67-74; 325 US. at 506. The good faith of the
defendants was variously used to show what was counseled ("refusal," not "evasion"), how
it was counseled (openly, not stealthily), and the innocent purpose of the agreement to
counsel (honest, not sinister and undisclosed).
74. Id. at 498 (concurring opinion). Justice Rutledge's concurrence can be seen as very
close to the prevailing opinion of Justice Roberts, for he may be understood as declaring
that one who engages in "sheer political discussion" does not have the requisite intent to
counsel violation of a law, a view which combines theories of criminal intent and the
protection of free speech. See Part V infra.
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sistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human
will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil."701 As a general matter, the requirement
is that conduct be done "intentionally," but the importance of the
concept has not often been matched by the clarity of its exposition.7
The Model Penal Code77 has attempted to unravel different strands of
the requirement, and it makes clear much that traditional analysis ob-
scures.78
75. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). The mens rea requirement has
been explicitly abandoned in the "strict liability" cases, which the Court took pains to
distinguish. E.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); United States v. Dotterweidc,
320 US. 277 (1943); see Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLum. L. Pmv. 55 (1933); cf. H.M.
Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CotrrstP. PRon. 401, 432 n.70 (1958)
(Morissette had no better claim than Dotterweich to a miens rea defense, though it dsould
have been allowed to both). It has traditionally been defended as a sine qua non of the
moral culpability which alone justifies the sanctions imposed by the criminal law. 4
BLACSTOrNE, Cotr,=nTres, ch. IU. It has lately been attacked as outmoded and un-
scientific in an age of treatment and determinism; e.g., B. Woorro.v, CRI.m A-D Tim
CRmAL LAw 46-57 et seq., and there is now a debate about the justification of the
doctrine. Compare J. HALL, GENERaA. PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 146-70 (2d ed. 1960)
(moral guilt at the heart of mens rea), with H.L.A. IRTr, Pu.mtsitr A nD REspost-
BILrr 28-53, 180-85, 206-09 (1968) (utilitarian justification of mens tea), and Wasserstrom,
H. L. A. Hart and Mens Rea, 35 U. CH. L. R1v. 92 (1967) (defending Hall against H. L A.
Hart). See also Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Cr. Rrv. 107 (both
justifications advanced). Packer's utilitarian justification is the simple one that men cannot
be deterred from doing what they do not know they should not do, but it is open to the
criticism that negligence can be deterred and that punishing faultless wrongdoing may
reduce the impulse to gamble on fooling a court about one's fault. H.L.A. HART, supra,
at 18-21 (criticizing Bentham's version of this justification, which in its turn was ad-
vanced as a response to Blackstone).
H. L. A. Hart's position is more complicated. It is based on the virtue of a system
which lets men order their affairs according to their own plans and permits them to rely
on their intentions as rough guides to the conduct for which they will be held account-
able. This Comment starts from Justice Jackson's premise that we have accepted the doc-
trine of mens tea and the excuses that go along with it. Cf. Packer, supra; H.M. Hart, Jr.,
supra (mens tea should be prerequisite of criminal responsibility but very often is not).
76. According to Justice Jackson, "The unanimity with which [courts] have adhered
to the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized
by the variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive
mental element in crime." Morissette v. United States, 342 US. 246, 252 (1952). For ac-
counts of the doctrine in its historical context, see J. HALL, supra note 75, at 70-104;
Ldvitt, Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 117 ILL L. REv. 117 (1922). See also note 78
infra.
77. MODE. PENAL CODE §§ 2.01, 2.02, 2.04, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
78. The traditional dichotomy between "general" and "specific" intent, when it has
had any ascertainable content at all, has been used to make two sets of distinctions. First,
specific intent may have to be shown "specially," while general intent may be presumed
from the performance of an illegal act. This presumption may be rebuttable, thus shifting
the burden of proof. Eg., CA.. EvmEcN CODE § 668 (West 1966); 1 F. WnRTauo. CMINA.
EvmErcE 243-44 (12th ed. 1955); J. HALL, supra note 75, at 144. Or it may be conclusive, thus
eliminating the mens rea requirement as to some elements of the offense for which it
would be required in "specific intent" crimes. See, e.g., D.P.P. v. Smith, 3 All. E.R. 161
(1960); Westbrook, The Role of Specific Intent in Texas Criminal Law, 14 BAYLOR L Rtv.
32, 55-37 (1962). Holmes's view is similar. Compare O.W. Hot-.NEes, Tie Co~M oN LAW
55-57 (1881), with Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). On the other hand, the distinction may refer to what the Model Penal Code calls
"kinds of culpability." See note 79 infra. Crimes of specific intent may require that the
result a law is designed to prevent be desired by the actor-that achieving them was the
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The Code rejects the traditional distinction between "specific in-
tent" and "general intent" and distinguishes instead four different
levels of intent: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.1 0
Furthermore, mens rea is not a unitary concept in any crime; rather,
each element of an offense should be examined separately to deter-
mine what level of intent the law requires.80 The Code proposes the
general rule that intent will not be "presumed": in every crime, un-
less the statute plainly provides otherwise, purpose, knowledge or
recklessness must be shown with respect to each material element 81
purpose of his conduct. This is also part of Holmes's view: Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (dissenting opinion); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). See
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment, at 124-25 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:10 (1951). Or, as in first degree murder, "premeditation" may be required.
State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 P. 1071 (1915). But see Commonwealth v, Jones, 335
Pa. 522, 525-26, 50 A.2d 317, 319 (1947) (intent to take life is sufficient to establish pre.
meditation). Finally, the two distinctions may both be involved in the concept of "further
intention," for which specific intent is sometimes a synonym. "A man gets into a dwelling
house at night and the question is not, or not merely, 'Did he do that intentionally?' but
'Did he do that with the further intention, or (as lawyers like to say,) "with the Intent"
of stealing something?' If so he is guilty of burglary, even if in fact he did not steal any-
thing." H.L.A. HART, supra note 75, at 118. Further intent is a requirement of purpose
as to a new element of the offense, but the crime is inchoate as to this element.
79. The Code offers the following definitions:
(2) Kinds of culpability defined.(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it
is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a
result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the
existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant cir.
cumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or he knows of the
existence of such circumstances; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that It Is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct anid
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situa-
tion.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and pur-
pose of his conduct, the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
80. Id. § 2.02, Comment, at 123-24 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
81. The Code points out the difference between elements of a crime which have to do
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of the offense. 2 This is the rule of "full" mens rea, and it was adopted
by the Supreme Court in Morissette v. United States13 as the normal
mens rea requirement for federal criminal statutes.8 4
Morissette had removed some spent bomb casings from property
owned by the United States Government and had sold them for scrap
iron. He was arrested and prosecuted for knowing conversion under
the federal theft statute.85 At trial, Morissette claimed that he had
thought the casings were abandoned and that he therefore had a right
to take them. He argued that the jury should be instructed to find
him not guilty if it believed his professions of good faith. The trial
court thought otherwise. "The question of intent," it ruled, is only
"whether or not he intended to take the property."8 0 Morissette was
convicted, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that mens
rea was required and that this requirement entitled Morissette
to go to the jury with his good faith claim. In effect, die Supreme
Court found that the material elements of criminal conversion include
(1) taking property which (2) one is not entitled to take. The Court
required a showing of intent for each element, while the trial court
had required it only of the first. And the intent which had to be
shown for the second element under the Supreme Court's holding was,
as under the Model Penal Code formulation, knowledge or at least
recklessness. Morissette had warning that he might have no right to
take the casings; until the moment of taking, they did not belong to
him, and they were on an Air Force firing range. He might well have
been negligent in not inquiring further about the status of the prop-
erty. But the Supreme Court nevertheless held that because mens rea
was required the government had to show more than a negligent
failure to inquire; the issue was Morissette's actual belief, not what
he should have believed or had reason to suspect.8T
sith culpability and those which are essentially jurisdictional. MODE. PENAL CODE §
1.14(10) and Comment, at 118-19 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). A distinction can aio be made
between ordinary elements relating to culpability and those which create an arbitrary line
dividing conduct which is in fact on a continuum of culpability. Cf. Regina v. Prince,
L.R. 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875).
82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
83. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
84. Except for "public welfare offenses," which the Court said may be "strict liability"
offenses. See note 75 supra. It has been pointed out that the Court could have excused
Morissette without bringing the whole mens rea doctrine to his defense, since tEi well-
established rule that a claim of right is an excuse to a theft charge would have sufficed.
H.M. Hart, Jr., supra note 75, at 431 n.70; Packer, supra note 75, at 121. The opinion is
nevertheless valuable as the hardest look the Court has given to the doctrine.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1964): "'Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knouingly converts"
government property is punishable by fine and imprisonment.
86. 342 U.S. at 275-76.
87. Id. at 275-76.
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The intent required in Morissette, and said by the Supreme Court
to be applicable to all federal offenses, shows a further aspect of the
mens rea doctrine which is crucial to the crime of counseling. The de-
fense of a "claim of right" in Morissette was of course no innovation
but a standard defense to theft at common law.88 It is one of the
limitations on the famous maxim, ignorantia legis neminem excusat,8"
since a claim of right may be based on ignorance or mistake of the law
of property 0 The drafters of Model Penal Code put the matter
clearly:
It should be noted that the general principal that ignorance or
mistake of law is no excuse is usually greatly overstated; it has
no application when the circumstances made material by the de-
finition of the offense include a legal element. So, for example, it
is immaterial in theft, when claim of right is adduced in defense,
that the claim involves a legal judgment as to the right of property.
It is a defense because knowledge that the property belongs to
someone else is a material element of the crime and such knowl-
edge may involve matter of law as well as fact. But in so far as this
point is involved there is no need to state a special principle; the
legal element involved is simply an aspect of the attendant cir-
cumstances, with respect to which knowledge, recklessness or neg-
ligence, as the case may be, is required for culpability .... The
law involved is not the law defining the offense; it is some other
legal rule that characterizes the attendant circumstances that are
material to the offense.01
The distinction between "the law defining the offense" and some
other rule that characterizes a material circumstance is a reflection
of the distinction orthodox mens rea doctrine draws between knowing
one is doing an act of a particular description and knowing that in do-
ing such an act one is violating the law. Criminal statutes define
conduct and prohibit what they define; the intent required by ortho-
dox mens rea doctrine focuses on knowingly doing the conduct
88. Justice Jackson compiled American cases. 342 U.S. at 261 n.19. For the English law,
see G. WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 321-27.
89. See BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *27. The maxim is elegantly discussed in Keedy.
Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REv. 75 (1908). See generally Ryu
& Silving, Error Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. CHL L. REV. 421 (1957); Hall &' Selig-
man, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. Cm. L. Ray. 641 (1941).
90. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954); Sayre, Mens
Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 999 (1932); Hall, Ignorance & Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND,
L.J. 1, 27-29 (1957). Morissette's mistake seems to have been at least in part a mistake ol
law, but it is unclear whether the trial judge thought that Morissette had been wrong about
what the government had to do in order to abandon property (a question of law) or about
whether the government had done it (a question of fact).
91. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment 131 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (emphasis added).
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described by law, not on knowing that it is so described or that it is
prohibited.92 Of course, "conduct" in this sense is more than muscular
contractions; 93 someone who is mistaken about the "material" cir-
cumstances in which he acts has not "intentionally" done what the law
describes.94 With this caveat, orthodox mens rea doctrine excuses ig-
norance or mistake about the nature of the conduct engaged in, but
not about whether it was prohibited.95
The consistent presence of a full mens rea requirement in the his-
tory of counseling crimes and the inclusion of the word "knowingly"
in the federal statute defining the draft counseling offenses require
at least that, as in Morissette, normal mens rea in the Model Penal
Code's sense be required-purpose, knowledge, or recklessness as to
each material element.
B. Counseling Refusal to Submit to Induction
The Supreme Court's analysis in the Morisselte case suggests that
proper classification of the registrant counseled must be considered,
92. See, e.g., HL.A. HART, supra note 75, at 36; Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246. 257(1907): "If a man intentionally adopts certain conduct in certain circumstances known to
him; and that conduct is forbidden by the law under those circumstances, he intentionall)
breaks the law in the only sense in which the law ever considers intent." But see pp.
1030-32 infra.
93. The law does not prohibit moving one's finger, or pulling a trigger, or firing a
gun, or aiming it before firing, but it has forbidden the conjunction of all these things
when it is a person who is being aimed at. The criminal "act" is therefore not moving.
pulling a trigger, etc., but doing what the law forbids in the circumstances in which it is
forbidden. On the related hazard of seeking to define when "an act" begins and ends with-
out the benefit of a statutory definition of the act, see Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75
YA.E LJ. 262, 275-76 (1965) (citing J.L. Austin).
94. See, e.g., Packer, supra note 75, at 141-42. Hall & Seligman, Mistahe of Law, and
Mens Rea, 8 U. Cm. L. Rav. 641, 665-66 (1941), point to recognition and denial of the
good faith belief defense by different courts and conclude that the "defendant's knowledge
that his actions are in violation of the express provisions of a statute would seem in many
cases to show a sufficiently corrupt intent to warrant conviction even for a crime requiring
a specific intent to act fraudulently or illegally." 8 U. Cm. L. REv,. at 666 n.107. But the
Model Penal Code's suggestion is preferable: "When knowledge of a particular fact is an
element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a substantial
probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist." MODEL PENAL
Cone § 2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added).
95. The law of property places goods in different statuses and describes rights between
private parties to these goods; the law of theft penalizes taking goods which are in given
statuses. The distinction between "law defining the offense" and "legal elements of a
material circumstance" is thus a distinction between the criminal law-whose obligations
one must obey and ignorance of which will not excuse-and the civil law material to it
-ignorance of which is ignorance of a material circumstance connected with a particular
action and thus implies a lack of "intent" to do the act described and forbidden by crim-
inal law. This distinction, with minor variations, is drawn by the commentators who have
attempted to go beyond the mystique of "specific" and "corrupt" intent. The most ex-
haustive treatment is G. Wit..aas, supra note 14, at 304-45. Hall, Ignorance & Mistahe in
the Criminal Law, 33 io. L.J. 1, 27-29 (1957), and Keedy, Ignorance & Mistahe in the
Criminal Law, 22 H-Lv. L. Rav. 75, 90-96 (1908), are in substantial accord, though Keedy's
terminology is odd and Hall favors an exception for those parts of civil law, like tort law,
which "reflect simple moral values."
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like ownership in theft prosecutions, as a material element of the crime
of draft counseling. Therefore, a good faith mistake about the pro-
priety of the classification must be a good defense to a charge of coun-
seling refusal to submit to induction.
It is not always a crime to refuse to submit to induction, despite
the wording of the law. Proper classification"0 and procedure 7 by the
Selective Service System are prerequisites to a lawful order to submit.0 8
And counseling disobedience to an unlawful order is no crime at all.00
Proper classification and procedure should therefore be considered
elements of the offense of draft counseling. For the rules concerning
classification and procedure do not define the duty to submit to in-
duction; they are civil determinations which the Act instructs the Se-
lective Service System to make. Mistaken belief that a registrant has
been wrongly classified or processed-or that the classification pro-
cedures violate the equal protection or due process clauses-is a mis-
taken apprehension about the circumstances in which the registrant
refuses to submit. Such a mistake relates to the details of an adminis-
trative statute which is as collateral to the primary duty to submit to
induction as the law of property was to the law of theft in Morissette.
Proper classification and procedure should be considered "material
elements," in the language of the Model Penal Code, since they re-
late to "the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be prevented
by the law defining the offense."' 00 The allowance of the defenses of
improper classification and procedure establishes that the evil to be
96. Classification may be improper because the wrong legal standard was used by a
draft board. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955); United States v. Carroll, 398
F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1968), or because the board's classification was simply so erroneous as to
have "no basis in fact." Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), Dickinson v. United
States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
97. Improper Selective Service procedure voids an induction order. See Simmons v.
United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955); Boswell v. United States, 390 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Walsh, 279 F. Supp. 115 (D. Mass. 1968). There is a "presumption of regu-
larity" which cloaks Selective Service procedure, but the presumption is rebuttable. E.g.,
United States v. Bellmer, 404 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1968); see United States v. Lybrand, 279
F. Supp. 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (procedural regularity a material element of offense of refusal
to submit to induction and must if the issue is raised be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt as any other element). See generally 1 SEL. SERy. L. REP. 1147-48 (1968), and sources
cited therein.
98. Notes 108 and 109 supra. The addition of "refuse" to the prohibition of "evasion"
in 1948 makes it necessary to read the statute as reaching only those who unlawfully "refuse
registration or service," because refusal of service is legal when the order to serve is not.
99. Since a registrant has not violated the law when he "refuses or evades registration
or service" after receiving an unlawful order, the same qualification must be read into
the crime of counseling another "to refuse or evade registration or service." The alternative
is to take the extraordinary step of asserting that counseling of legal behavior is a crime,
going in the face of the common law history of the crime of counseling with no justifica-
tion whatsoever in the legislative history of the provision. In any event, the first amend-
ment alone would seem clearly to preclude such a reading of the law.
100. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(10) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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prevented by the statute was the refusal to submit to orders lawful in
this respect.1 1
The Morissette analysis suggests that a registrant who makes a good
faith mistake about the propriety of the classification underlying his
order to submit to induction could not be convicted of intentionally
disobeying that order. No case has allowed this good faith belief de-
fense, however,10 2 and it is possible to argue that such a defense would
defeat the manifest policy of the Act. The Supreme Court has upheld
Congress's determination--embodied in Section 10(b) (3)' 3 -that for
an army to be raised efficiently, registrants must be processed without
the delay caused by litigation. 04 Allowing registrants a defense of good
faith mistake about the validity of their classification would permit
them to refuse induction and litigate the classification issue with little
risk if they could prove that they believed that they should not have
been called-effectively defeating the policy of speedy processing.
Whatever the force of this justification for a serious inroad on a
fundamental principle of criminal law in the case of a registrant, there
101. Estep v. United States, 827 U.S. 114 (1946), the case which allowed judicial review
of a refusal to submit to induction, was premised on the Board's lack of jurisdiction to
issue an unlawful order, but this fact should not be thought to remove improper dassi-
fication from the status of a "material element." Nonmaterial elements are those which
"relate exclusively to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any other matter
similarly unconnected with (i) the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense, or (ii) the existence of a justification or excuse
for such conduct" MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(10) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). After
Estep established the defense of unlawfulness of the order, it is clear that it is only the
court's jurisdiction over the person and over the subject matter, not the local board'sjurisdiction, which would come under the definition of nonmaterial elements.
102. The only reported case which explicitly deals with mens rea in refusal to submit
to induction is ambiguous:
If the Government proves defendant intentionally refused to comply with an order
of his draft board, in accordance with the statute, to submit to induction, it is not
open to defendant to offer as an excuse that he regarded the war as illegal.... [I]n a
prosecution for wilfully refusing to obey an induction order, evidence with respect
to belief is admissible only to the extent it bears upon the issue of intent, as dis.
tinguished from motive or good faith.
United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515, 519 (1968). In virtually every contested
prosecution, however, the defendant contends at trial that he should not have
been ordered to submit. Courts have not suggested that defendants could otherwise be
acquitted; honest belief has not been thought reason enough to excuse. But ef. cases cited
note 115 infra.
103. See note 10 supra.
104. The circumstances under which the Act was adopted lend no support to a view
which would allow litigious interruption of the process of selection which Congress
created. To meet the need which it felt for mobilizing national manpower in the
shortest practicable period, Congress established a machinery which it deemed elficient
for inducting great numbers of men into the armed forces. Careful provision was made
for fair administration of the Act's policies within the framework of the selective
service process. But Congress apparently regarded "a prompt and unhesitating obe-
dience to orders" issued in that process "indispensable to the complete attainment
of the object" of national defense.
Falbo v. United States, 220 U.S. 549, 554 (1944). But see Oestereich v. Local Bd. No. 11,393
US. 233 (1968) (Section 10(b)(3) not applicable to certain statutory exemptions).
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is no adequate justification for abandoning the normal mens rea re-
quirement for draft counselors. Section 10(b)(3) is a specifically enacted
exception to ordinary procedure applicable by its own terms only to
registrants. Moreover, the counselor is being neither classified nor
drafted, and is at best a very indirect object of the goal of speedy pro-
cessing.
The mens rea analysis presented here does not by itself yield a full-
fledged good faith belief defense to the crime of counseling refusal
to submit to induction. An objection to the basic duty to register and
serve-on the grounds that the peacetime draft is unconstitutional, 10
for example-does not reach any matter that can be classified as col-
lateral civil law made material to the offense. 100 Subsequent sections
of this Comment, however, will show that the good faith defense
must reach any honest belief in the ultimate legality of the conduct
counseled.
C. Counseling Violation of Other Duties
The order to submit to induction is only the last of many demands
which the Selective Service System makes of a registrant. If a counselor
advocates violation of the possession requirement, 10 7 for example, and
his advice is taken, the draft registrant may be prosecuted for violation
of the requirement or classified I-A as a delinquent and ordered to re-
port for induction. 08 If the counselor advises refusal of an accelerated
order to submit to induction because he believes that the registrant
has violated no legal duty by failing to possess a draft card, the Moris.
sette analysis requires that he should have the defense of a good faith
belief. Accelerated induction is unlawful where the registrant is
105. Cf. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 866 (1918).
106. To give a further example, an argument that the war in Vietnam, and hence
conscription for it, is illegal does not put the classificatory process in issue as does the
argument that nonreligious conscientious objectors are entitled to 1-0 status if religious
CO's are so classified.
107. The counselor might think the possession requirement invalid because (1) it is an
abridgment of the registrant's freedom of speech and right to privacy which is not out-
weighed by any legitimate governmental interest; or (2) it restricts the registrant's exercise
of symbolic speech, such as participating in a ceremony in which a number of registrants
return their draft cards to their local boards, cf. Oestereich v. Local lid. No. 11, 893 U.S.
2382 (1968); or (3) it is not, in fact, a criminally-punishable duty under 32 C.F.R. Q 1617.1
(1969). See Dranitzke, Possession of Registration Certificates and Notices of Classification
by Selective Service Registrants, 1 SaL. SERV. L. REP. 4029 (1968).
108. Anyone who "fails or neglects to perform any duty required of him under tile
provisions of the selective service law" is a delinquent, 82 C.F.R. § 1602.4 (1969), and the
local board may declare him to be one. Id. § 1642.4(a). "Any delinquent registrant . ..
may be classified in or reclassified into Class I-A, Class I-A-O, or Class 1-0, whichever Is
applicable, regardless of other circumstances . . .", id. § 1642.12, and "[T]he local board
shall order each delinquent registrant ... to report for induction . . .or ... shall order
him to perform ... civilian work in lieu of induction .... " Id. § 1642.13.
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guilty of no unlawful conduct; like proper classification, therefore,
the legality of the conduct leading up to the accelerated order must be
considered a material element of the crime of draft counseling.
The Morissette analysis does not, however, yield the good faith
defense when the charge is counseling violation of the possession duty
itself, rather than the refusal to submit to an accelerated induction.
The regulation alone establishes the possession requirement; there is,
again, nothing that can be analogized to collateral civil law. Different
principles concerning the mens rea requirement, however, resting
upon the nature of the Selective Service law, justify granting the good
faith defense to counselors who advocate violation of duties prior to
the order to submit to induction.
The duties imposed on draft registrants are numerous and complex;
their main function is promotion of administrative convenience and
only very indirectly prevention of harm to society.109 They are, in
traditional terminology, mala prohibita. The case for the ignorantia
legis rule is weakest for such crimes because there is no basis for saying
a defendant voluntarily caused harm unless he knew he was violating
the law. As Henry Hart has pointed out,
If. . .the criminal law adheres to this maxim [ignorantia legis]
when it moves from the condemnation of those things which are
mala in se to the condemnation of those things which are merely
mala prohibita, it necessarily shifts its ground from a demand that
every responsible member of the community understand and
respect the community's moral values to a demand that everyone
know and understand what is written in the statue books.110
109. See, e.g., 50 App. U.S.C. § 453 (Supp. MI, 1968). 32 C.F.R. § 1611.1 (1969) (duty to
register at 18); 32 C.F.R. § 1611.7(a) (duty to familiarize oneself with duties under regula-
dons); id. § 1617.1 (duty to have unaltered registration certificate in personal possession);
id. § 1625.1(b) (duty of registrant and others who file a request far registrant's deferment
to inform board of "any fact that might result in the registrant being placed in a different
classification'); id. § 1632.14 (duty to report for and submit to induction); id. § 1641.7 (duty
to report cm-rent status and physical condition to board); id. § 1660.30 (duty to obey order
to perform civilian work). Employees of the system may also become felons without much
effort. E.g., 32 C..R. § 1641.7 (1969) (duty to conduct themselves in such a manner that
the work of the System is effectively accomplished; to be courteous, considerate, and
prompt; not to bring discredit or embarrassment to the System). Although it is difficult
to believe that such administrative directives were intended to be criminally enforced.
deviation from them appears to be punishable under Section 12(a) of the Act, which pro.
vides: "Any member of the Selective Service System or any other person charged as her en
with the duty of carrying out any of the provisions of this title, or the rules or regulations
made or directions given thereunder, who shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform
such duty.. ." is guilty of a felony. 50 App. U.S.C. § 462(a) (Supp. M, 1968).
The consequence of the draft regulations being a complex, voluminous, and often vague
set of requirements enforced through a catch-all phrase in the statute has been suggested
in cases such as Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952), discused in
note 122 infra.
110. H.M. Hart, Jr., supra note 75, at 419 (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court has recognized a defense of a good faith mis-
take of law under the tax code. In United States v. Murdock"' it in-
terpreted a statutory "willfulness" standard to excuse a violation of the
tax code's reporting duty which Murdock thought was justified by
the privilege against self-incrimination. 1 2 The Court held that the
willfulness standard, in the context of an extraordinarily complex
statute, required that a criminal act or omission be committed "with.
out ground for believing it is lawful" or with "careless disregard
whether or not one has the right so to act." 3 The administrative,
quasi-criminal nature of the duties under the draft law, like those
imposed by the tax code, justify holding that violations are not felon-
ious where the violator thought he was within his legal rights."14
The ideas of culpability and voluntariness underlying the mens rea
doctrine might, therefore, reasonably be read to excuse registrants
who, like Murdock, believe that they are not required by valid law to
perform any given conduct. And, in fact, the cases discussing a regis-
trant's intent in prosecutions for violations of obligations have said
that willful violation of law is required and granted a limited de-
fense of mistake about obligations under the law."15 While the same
111. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
112. Murdock had lost on this issue in United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
It was on remand of this case that Murdock unsuccessfully attempted to have his good
faith belief in the legality of his conduct put before the jury. The holding of the first
Murdock case, that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in federal hear-
ings to state criminal jeopardy, was overruled by Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 878
U.S. 52 (1964).
113. 290 U.S. at 394-95. The Court continued:
Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as
to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to the adequacy
of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to measure
up to the prescribed standard of conduct. And the requirement that the omission
in these instances must be willful, to be criminal, is persuasive that the same element
is essential to the offense of failing to supply information.
Id. at 396.
114. And since most violations of the draft law, like Murdock's violation of the tax
code, are by omission rather than commission, there is even less basis for saying that the
offender has consciously done something evil or actively put himself outside the law than
there would be if his positive conduct had been forbidden by law. See Hughes, Criminal
Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 600-14 (1958); Lambert v. California, 355 US. 225 (1957). It
is possible that Lambert leads to a defense of non-negligent ignorance of the law where
omission to perform a statutory duty is only mala prohibita.
115. E.g., United States v. Rabb, 394 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1968) (refusal to report for
induction must be "willful," and willfullness is a state of mind in which a defendant is
fully aware of his obligations to comply with the order to report for induction; conviction re-
versed because defendant's testimony indicated he did not report only because he was
reasonably awaiting a ruling on a claim for deferment he had recently submitted). Accord,
Silverman v. United States, 220 F.2d 36, 39-40 (8th Cir, 1955) (intent to evade, not mere
knowing failure to report, is necessary to convict for failure to report for induction; con.
viction affirmed); United States v. Hoffman, 137 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1943) (same; conviction
reversed).
To interject a note of realism, one need only compare the Government's position
toward a registrant who refuses induction with that towards one who disobeys another
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considerations of speedy processing which alone could justify restrict-
ing the mens rea defense in prosecutions for refusal to submit to in-
duction may be applicable when other duties are involved, and
hence might restrict the scope of the "willfulness" standard applied to
registrants who violate the law, draft counselors, again, should be
entitled to the fall reach of the defense. The statutory requirement
of "knowing" counsel of illegal conduct would therefore be read to
reach as far as the "willfulness" standard in Murdoch: 110 to excuse
counsel of all conduct or omissions which the counselor did not know
violated any valid law. Such a defense, while going beyond a normal
mens rea requirement, would respond to the concern of the mens rea
doctrine that only the voluntary commission of harm be punished.
IV. Vagueness
Much of the Selective Service Act is vulnerable to challenges on the
grounds of vagueness. The web of duties imposed by the Act and
regulations is defined with remarkable informality and imprecision.
1 1 7
The possession requirement, for example, cannot be complied with if
read literally,11 and other requirements are so broad as to be little
draft obligation, when both assert the good faith defense, to realize the far more pressing
need for the defense to be allowed in the latter case if substantial constitutional issues are
not to be raised. In the case of registrants whose refusals of induction orders are based on
an erroneous (albeit honestly believed) reading of the draft law, the prosecution is often
willing to allow the registrant to agree to join the armed services once it becomes apparent
his case has been lost. But what of the eighteen-year-old who refuses to report his
"current status" to his local board? If he is proven wrong on the law, he will not find
(nor would the Government attorney probably offer) induction as an alternative to
conviction for the draft offense. Yet if his belief is bona fide, and his normal date of
induction far in the future, denying him the good faith belief defense cannot be justified
on the basis that his refusal of this regulatory duty interfered with his "speedy processing"
into the armed forces.
116. The Selective Service System itself has lent some support to this reading of the
Act by its interpretation of the legislative history. See p. 1016 supra. Indeed, it is difficult
to attach any other meaning to the specific addition of a "knowingly" requirement to the
offense of draft counseling, since counseling is always intentional conduct.
117. Duties defined in Section 12(b) are relatively precise. In Section 12(a), the prohlibi-
tion on "hindering or interfering in any way . .. with the administration of this Act." is
evidently boundless. It might reach the registrant who is late for an appointment or the
local board member who resigns because of rU-health or opposition to United States
foreign policy. The 1940 Act limited the provision to knowingly "hindering and interfer-
ing by force or violence." The Fifth Circuit read this limitation strictly to bar conviction
of a registrant who had tom up his Classification Questionnaire and muttered dnnkenly
about his draft board. Bagley v. United States, 136 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1943). Congress re-
plied to this attempt at limitation by adding "or otherwise" after "by force or violence"
in 1948. The requirement of a purpose to hinder or interfere has been suggested. Chambers
v. United States, 391 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1968). But this leaves the provision reaching acts
of protest and pique. Most of the duties reached by Section 12(a) are in the Regulations,
which are complex, vague, and profuse. See note 109 supra.
118. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1617.1, 1623.5 (1967). To quote § 1617.1:
Effect of failure to have unaltered registration certificate in personal possession.-
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more than general admonitions.119 Absent a strict intent rule, coun-
selors and registrants would have to rely on the generosity or selectivity
of prosecutors to excuse technical violations of the law even when
innocent and harmless. A good faith belief defense speaks to the prob-
lems posed by the uncertainty of the Act.
Courts faced with prosecutions under the draft law have a difficult
job of interpretation to give meaning to its provisions. If the
Act and regulations often cannot mean what they say, it is by no
means certain what they do mean. The Supreme Court's reliance on
intent requirements in interpreting vague statutes' 20 -particularly
when they are federal' 21-is addressed to the dilemma of those who,
like the draft counselor, cannot reasonably be required to know the
scope of a statutory duty at their peril. The solution the intent require-
ment reaches when it is properly used incorporates part of the good
faith belief defense: a defendant to be convicted under a vague statute
must know or believe that his conduct was of the sort comprehended
by its terms. 122
Every person required to present himself for and submit to registration must, after he
is registered, have in his personal possession at all times his Registration Certificate....
The failure of any person to have his Registration Certificate (SSS Form 2) in his
personal possession shall be prima facie evidence of his failure to register.
See 1 SEL. SRv. L. REP. 1184 (1968). It has been seriously argued that possession of a card
should not be included in the "requirements" reached by Section 12(a). Dranitzke, Posses-
sion of Registration Certificates and Notices of Classification by Selective Service Regis-
trants, I Sx.. SERV. L. REP. 4029 (1968). Most of the vague requirements, however, are
worded to leave no doubt that they are the sort of duty reached by Section 12(a). See, e.g.,
note 119 infra.
119. E.g., "It shall be the duty of every classified registrant to keep his local board
currently informed . . . of his physical condition. . . . Every classified registrant shall,
within 10 days after it occurs, report to his local board in writing every change . . . In
his physical condition .... " 32 C.F.R. § 1641.7 (1969). Informality particularly pervades
the regulations prescribing duties for the administrators of Selective Service, and these
regulations too are part of the "requirements" reached by the counseling provision.
120. The first case is Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918). There were soon
quite a few cases upholding vague statutes. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342
U.S. 337 (1952); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1915); United
States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942); Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941); 1lygrade
Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925); cf. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961).
121. Only the two earliest cases, Omaechevarria and Hygrade Provision Co., supra,
were state cases. The Supreme Court's preference for construing federal statutes narrowly
rather than striking them down is discussed in Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 86, 101 n.184 (1960).
122. Thus in Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952), the Court
found the vagueness of a regulation cured by a requirement of "knowing" violation. The
regulation required trucks to avoid certain routes "so far as practicable, and where
feasible"--a standard challenged as vague. The kind of mistake which would ordinarily
excuse would be a mistake about what hazards were on the route taken or that another
route was available. The mistake which the Court suggests would excuse a violation
would be an incorrect interpretation of the vague standard: the defendant takes route A
thinking it the "safest practicable" as required by law; the jury, or judge, knowing just
1034
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The critics of reliance on intent requirements to cure vague statutes
have made the device seem more dramatic and less useful than it
actually is. An intent requirement does not make or attempt to make
a statute any less vague m Nor does it "amount to asserting that the
black heart of the defendant enables him to know what ... judges
are not able to define."'-' 4 Instead, the defendant's belief that he is
within the terms of a statutory prohibition may substitute for the
reasonable notice most criminal statutes are thought to give. The
justification is obvious: vague standards more easily than precise ones
can trap defendants into unwitting violation of law. Requiring knowl-
the same facts, applies a different standard and finds route B the "safest practicable"; the
Court suggests that the defendant would be excused.
Justice Frankfurter explains Justice Brandeis's opinion in Oinacchez'arria in similar
terms. The statute there codified the practice that sheepherders should not let sheep
graze on any "range usually occupied by any cattle grower." Defendants were protected
against the vagueness of this phrase by an intent requirement which meant, said justice
Frankfurter, that "under the Act a man would have to know that he was grazing sheep
where he had no business to graze them." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 156 (1945)
(dissenting opinion). The intent standard suggested is the same as that in Boyce: a man
does not know he is grazing sheep where he should not unless his interpretation of "range
usually occupied by any cattle grower" is the same as what the statute is officially con-
strued to mean. This standard is precisely what Justice Holmes found to be beyond the
limits of ordinary mens rea requirements in Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 2.16, 257 (1907).
Sheriff Screws was convicted of "willfully" depriving a prisoner of "rights, privileges,
and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment" by beating him to death.
Justice Douglas's prevailing opinion purported to avoid the problem of the uncertain
standard by reading the "willfulness" requirement as "connoting a purpose to deprive a
person of a specific constitutional right." 325 U.S. at 101. The value of the standard is not
that it requires "purposeful" conduct: the willfulness standard must refer to and punish
only deprivations of rights known to the defendant. Vagueness is overcome because "One
who does act with such specific intent is aware that what he does is precisely that which
the statute forbids. He is under no necessity of guessing whether the statute applied to
him ... for he either knows or acts in reckless disregard of its prohibition of the depriva-
don of a defined constitutional or other federal right. ...The Act would not then
become a trap for law enforcement agencies acting in good faith." 325 U.S. at 104.
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), resolves the same problems in a slightly
different way. Watkins was prosecuted for failing to answer a question posed him by a
congressional committee. He was obligated to answer only "pertinent questions" but a
mistake about pertinence was precluded from serving as an excuse by a previous decision.
Therefore, said the Court, Congress must substitute a dear and easily knowable explana-
tion of "pertinence" to relieve the dilemma of a witness with a right to silence under
certain circumstances who does not know if he is in those circumstances.
123. Only constriction of the range of conduct prohibited by the statute can do that.
See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 US. 612 (1954); United States v. CIO, 335 US. 106
(1948).
124. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 151 (1945) (dissenting opinion). The Court has
on occasion moved beyond an actual belief standard in cases where a party's "knowing"
that he was within the terms of the statute was unlikely or perhaps in some sense imn-
possible. Thus the Screws majority chose a double test: the right involved had to be
"definite" enough to be knowable, and the defendant had to know it. In Williams v.
United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), the Court found a defendant convictable under the
Screws statute because he had been found to have the requisite specific intent and because
it was as "plain as a pikestaff" that his conduct had deprived a prisoner of due process.
341 US. at 101. In James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), "willful" violation of a tax
law (under the Murdock rule requiring knowledge of unlawfulness as a necessary ingredi-
ent of 'willfulness') was held to be impossible when the Court found the conduct involved
to be illegal only by overruling an earlier case.
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edge of violation of the law avoids the potential for unfair surprise
by holding a defendant only to what he actually believes. 2 5
Such an intent requirement could be used to protect defendants
under the Selective Service Act. The vague terms of the Act and Re-
gulations must contain an implied "reasonableness" modifier. To be
convicted a defendant would have to know not merely that given
conduct was literally encompassed by the words of a vague require-
ment but that he had "violated" it in the stronger sense that it was
meant to apply to the conduct involved in his case. So framed, the in-
tent device can be used in the draft law to excuse mistakes of law
which are-as a matter of constitutional law-reasonable.
This element of a good faith defense quite reasonably might apply
to registrants as well as counselors, though the same policies that limit
the ordinary mens rea defense also apply here.120 To whomever the
defense applies, in one sense it goes beyond ordinary mens rea be-
cause mistakes about material criminal-as well as civil-law will ex-
cuse under it. But in another sense it does not reach so far as the
ordinary mens rea standard. Since the excuse is based on the vague
wording of a statute, objections to the statute's constitutionality in
general do not seem relevant. Constitutional theories and beliefs would
be relevant only to the extent that they influence someone's interpreta-
tion of the meaning of a statute; registrants and counselors, like
judges, 27 may determine the meaning of words by looking at their
context.
While this sort of strict intent requirement can cure a vague statute
125. Opinions have stressed the surprise element even where they have not succeeded
in preventing it. Some relative successes are cited in note 122 supra. The failures are cases
where a bad purpose is thought to alleviate vagueness problms. Thus in Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 515 (1951), the Court found petitioner's argument-that the statute
which proscribed advocacy of overthrowing the United States government by force was
too vague---"particularly nonpersuasive when presented by petitioners, who, the jury
found, intended to overthrow the Government as speedily as circumstances would permit.
... A claim of guilelessness ill becomes those with evil intent." Since the defendants were
found to be within the terms of the statute, the Court seems to be saying, they could not
have been misled by it. Similarly, in Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941), the Court
was untroubled by the unfairness inherent in the expansive reading it gave to the phrase
"place connected with the national defense" in the Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 217,
because of "the obvious delimiting words in the statute ... requiring 'intent or reason
to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United
States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.' This requires those prosecuted to have
acted in bad faith. The sanctions apply only when scienter is established." 312 U.S. at 27-28.
But the bad purpose supplies no scienter because other nations may be aided by all
sorts of information and Gorin was prosecuted for giving a specific kind.
126. See p. 1029 supra.
127. E.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S.
106 (1948); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 407 (1950).
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like the draft law of its potential for unfair surprise, it does not really
respond to an important function of the void-for-vagueness doctrine:
the protection of substantive constitutional rights.'-" The Supreme
Court's treatment of mens rea requirements in free speech cases, how-
ever, suggests that adequate protection of the first amendment rights
of draft counselors requires a full-fledged good faith belief defense.
V. Free Speech
In protecting free expression, the Supreme Court has consistently
given substantial weight to the danger that even justified speech re-
gulation may deter speech which the regulation does not-or cannot-
prohibit.129 Prudent men allow a margin, which the law usually en-
courages, x30 between their actions and prohibited conduct. All laws
therefore deter more conduct than they forbid.131 In laws regulating
speech, this "chilling effect" is pernicious because of the need to pro-
tect free expression. The first amendment issue raised by draft counsel-
ing is particularly acute because of the vagueness of the Selective Ser-
vice Act.' 32
Draft counselors can marshal broad first amendment arguments
that no counseling can be prohibited.133 Even if some counseling may
be prohibited, counselors are entitled to incite legal conduct; 134 but
128. The intent requirement has been used primarily in cases where the speech interest
is not as central to the vagueness element as vague warning and the possibility of a
booby trap. Unhappy exceptions are Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), and
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
129. Eg., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
120. "Nor is it unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an
area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line." Bo)ce Motor
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373,
377 (1913).
131. See A. BIclLE, THE LEAST DANGEROus BRANcH 149 (1963).
132. "The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon
absence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legis-
lative powers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of first amendment freedoms,
the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application." NAACP
i% Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963), citing Note, supra note 121, 67 U. PA. L REV. at
75-76, 80-81, 96-104; see cases cited note 129 supra.
133. They may argue the "absolute" view that counseling is speech and therefore not
prohibitable. Cf. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 975,
989-96 (1969) (all speech should be protected except some "advice or instruction in various
illegal methods of evading the draft.. . .'). Or they may argue that their counsel is "di cus-
sion," not "incitement," or that it does not present a danger to national security sufficient to
outweigh its value to public discussion. Cf. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (concurring
opinion). Such an argument is strong in the Spocl case, even though it was rejected by the
First Circuit, where speech was uninflammatory and addressed itself to important public
issues.
134. See note 99 supra.
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the counseling provision threatens to deter much of this protected
speech because counselors who are uncertain what a court will think
of their legal beliefs may prefer silence to the risk of prosecution. The
resulting danger to free expression is greater under the draft law than
in other areas. For example, much of the speech deterred by obscenity
laws is almost obscene-tawdry if not illegal." 5  Laws prohibiting
incitement of violence also deter speech which resembles but does not
quite amount to "fighting words."1 30 Some of this speech will be
valuable, but if the original prohibition is justified the speech deterred
will tend to be almost bad enough to punish. The line between coun-
sel of legal and illegal conduct under the draft law, by contrast, is not
located on a continuum of speech that can be specified independently
of the law itself.137 The speech deterred by self-censorship of counselors
will be that which is most valuable-debate and counsel about pro-
visions of an important and controversial law, whose proper interpre-
tation is a grave but unresolved question and which may well be
invalid.
To prevent a "chilling effect," a court can simply strike down the
statute that causes it."3 But this action may protect speech or associa-
tion which a legislature wanted to prohibit and by hypothesis is em.
powered to prohibit.139 In at least two areas the Supreme Court has
moved toward the compromise of the good faith belief defense. In
New York Times v. Sullivan, 40 the Court held that in libel actions
by public officials "actual malice" on the part of the defendant must
be proved before damages can be awarded: the defendant must know
135. The definition of "obscenity" requires that the material be "utterly without re-
deeming social importance." Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966). On the
hazards and inconsistencies of the search for "social value," see Note, Maore Ado About
Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364 (1966).
136. Compare Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), with Terminlello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
137. The necessity for obeying the draft law is not that it codifies an obligation already
part of community mores; it cannot presently be said that it is immoral not to join the
army if one is not obligated to by law. With the absence of legal obligation, therefore,
the evil of failing to join the army disappears. The law, in short, is malum prohlbituo.
A qualification is necessary: conduct which is not "evasion" within the meaning of the
Act may nevertheless be very close to it-the term is one of degree.
138. E.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479 (1965).
139. Striking down a statute because of the effect it may have on speech it does not
actually prohibit-instead of limiting its scope with an intent requirement-may indicate
the Court's very low estimate of the state's interest in preventing what, theoretically, It
is entitled to prohibit or a fear that even with an intent requirement the deterrent effect
will be unusually large. Both these factors were present in Baggett, a loyalty oath case.
The Court is unimpressed by the merits of oaths, and oaths may deter more than criminal
laws because they are self-executing.
140. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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that his assertions are false or recklessly disregard whether they are
true or false.141 Justice Brennan, writing for six members of a unani-
mous Court, declared that a straight-forward defense of truth was not
sufficient to protect free expression, since it would still encourage self-
censorship: "Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of
proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech
will be deterred."'"- To avoid this chilling effect, the Court "over-
protected" speech: 43 the first amendment requires that good faith
belief in the truth of a defamatory statement be a complete defense in
a libel action.'-
The Court seems to be tending in a similar direction in obscenity
cases. In Smith v. California4 5 it held that a state could not impose
criminal liability on the seller of an obscene book without showing
that he had some knowledge of the contents of the book. Justice
Brennan's opinion leans heavily on the chilling effect of "strict" liabi-
lity, arguing that booksellers subject to such liability would restrict
the books they sold and "free expression would be the loser."'4 6 The
Court specifically declined to indicate the precise nature of the neces-
sary mental element though it listed the good faith belief defense
as one possibility: "honest mistake as to whether [a book's] contents
in fact constituted obscenity."'
147
141. This, it will be recalled, is the intent standard proposed by the Model Penal
Code applied to the element of the falsity of the speech.
142. 376 U.S. at 279.
143. "In order," as Harry Kalven, Jr., puts it, "to assure that it is not underprotected."
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 Sup. CT. RFv. 191, 213.
144. The actual malice standard of New York Times is what would be required for the
crime of criminal libel if that crime had an ordinary mens rea requirement; but the
Court's arguments go further by focusing on whatever is the objectionable quality of the
speech involved.
145. 361 US. 147 (1959).
146. Id. at 151.
147. No lower standard would have a significant effect on self-censorship. Booksellers,
unless they purchase by the pound, have some idea of what books they are selling. Strict
liability or no, their concern would be with that large class of books which are posible
candidates for official suppression. While eliminating strict liability ensures at least min-
imal notice for booksellers, self-censorship of books in the grey area-books which the
authors and distributors think have social value but which they fear they may be prose-
cuted for publishing-is likely to be significantly reduced only by providing a defense of
good faith belief in the legality of what was being published. The Court in Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), endorsed a statute which required knowledge of "the
character of the material defendants attempt to distribute," and, therefore. "calculated
purveyance of filth." This test seems dose to the good faith belief standard, but as it
was applied in Mishkin it is essentially a subjective "good motive" test. Indeed, a true
good faith belief defense would probably preclude almost any convictions for obscenit.
"Obscenity" is a concept whose elements are "unknowable" in the strongest sense. In
interpreting the reach of the Screws statute there is ambiguity but some clear cases of
violation and some standards to apply. In the obscenity area there are none. It would
therefore be extraordinarily difficult to find a defendant without a legitimate good faith
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The lesson of the obscenity and libel cases is the necessity of pro-
tecting important speech not only from criminal punishment but also
from indirect suppression, by the use of a defense of ignorance or mis-
take concerning the quality of the speech that makes it punishable. For
draft counseling this formula yields the good faith belief defense.
VI. The Right to Counsel and the Right to Litigate
Two aspects of the constitutional right to counsel give further
support to a full-fledged good faith belief defense for the crime of
draft counseling.
A. The Registrant's Need to Receive Advice
Draft registrants particularly need to obtain advice about their
rights and duties under the law. Because of the strictness of the ex-
haustion of remedies rule in the Selective Service process, registrants
may need counsel very early in their relationship with local boards.1'8
And because of Section 10(b)(3)'s limitation on the availability of
judicial review, a registrant may need advice which will include the
suggestion that he "violate" the law by refusing induction in order to
raise what his counselor believes are legitimate objections to Selective
Service action.
The registrant has a right to seek out legal counsel about his duties
under the draft law.149 And since counseling involves matters of con-
science and politics as well as law, ministers and other personal
advisers besides lawyers appropriately give draft counsel. For the
moment at least, since all young men have dealings with the Selective
belief defense to an obscenity charge, and no other standard meets the challenge Smith
sets for protecting speech. See generally Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALe L.J.
1564 (1966).
148. The rule common in administrative procedure cases, that one must pursue all
internal avenues of appeal before seeking judicial relief, has been strictly applied in
the area of Selective Service law. See, e.g., Badger v. United States, 322 F.2d 902, 906 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 914 (1964); Noland v. United States, 380 F.2d 1016 (10thCir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 945 (1967). But see Lockhart v. United States, 1 SrL. Srav. L.
REP. 8024 (9th Cir., Oct. 26, 1968) (relaxing the rule). The exhaustion of remedies doctrineis not the sole rationale for assuring the registrant counsel in his dealings with the draft
machinery; for most registrants, "the Selective Service System will often appear to be an
administrative obstacle course, covered with more legal pitfalls and frustrations than
anything they have ever encountered in the vastness of American bureaucracy." Comment,
The Selective Service System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 2123-24 (1966).
149. The sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel at crhn-inal trials seems to take for granted, at the very least, the generally accepted right of all
citizens to seek out legal advice in situations which have not matured into criminal trials.
Tax lawyers are a ready example of legal advisors whose good faith activities, relating
to their clients' civil and criminal problems with the Internal Revenue Service, are be-
yond question.
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Service System and since the number of lawyers is limited, effective
legal counsel is available to many only because lay groups and in-
dividuals undertake to give advice.150 Thus, the position of the lay
draft counselor is analogous to that of the prison writ writers to whom
the Supreme Court has recently extended protection.' 5 '
Protecting draft counseling, then, also protects the registrant's right
to receive counsel. A registrant could no more receive adequate draft
advice if his counselor were subject to criminal penalties in the event
he were wrong than a taxpayer could if his tax lawyer could be
prosecuted for good faith but erroneous advice that no tax was owing
or that no return had to be filed. The good faith belief defense guar-
antees to the registrant access to counselors who are free to give full
150. The Selective Service Act provides for Government Appeal Agents to be ap-
pointed for each local board to advise both registrants and the board. IA agent's pre-
scribed duties, however, place him in an impossible position for an attorney: "It shall
be the duty of the government appeal agent .. .To be equally diligent in protecting
the interests of the Government and the rights of the registrant in all matters." 32
C.F.R. § 1604.71(d)(5). A more satisfactory arrangement would be the appointment of
lawyers to a Selective Service panel in each judicial district under the Criminal Justice
Act, 18 US.C. § 3006A (Supp. I1, 1968), a practice which has already met with consider-
able success in the Northern District of California. 1 SEL. Ssav. L. RP. 4 (1968). From
this panel an attorney could then be designated to counsel any indigent registrant who
requested assistance. Although this would represent earlier involvement of appointed
counsel than has been typical in past criminal matters, almost any contact wit the Se.
lective Service System can bring a registrant to a "critical stage" in his relation to the
government. The appointment of counsel at an early stage would bring the position of
the indigent registrant into symmetry with that of a registrant who can afford an ad-
visor to protect his rights.
151. Johnson v. Avery, 393 US. 483 (1969). In an opinion by Justice Fortas which
appears to rest on both the Constitution and the federal habeas corpus statute, the Supreme
Court held that until Tennessee provides "some reasonable alternative . . . it may not
validly enforce a regulation... banning inmates from furnishing ... assistance to other
prisoners . . ." in preparing writs. 393 U.S. at 490.
The majority opinion in Johnson indicates that the Court is prepared to permit some
lay counseling; Justice Douglas's concurrence pulls out all stops. Using the urt.w riter as
an "acute" example, he examines the need for lay advocates to assist ordinary citizens
"to process a claim or even to make a complaint" in "[t]he increasing complexities of our
governmental apparatus at both the local and the federal levels. 393 U.S. at 491
(concurring opinion). The crisis presented by the shortage of legal counsel led Douglas
to conclude that "[Ilaymen-in and out of prison-should be allowed to act as 'next
friend' to any person in the preparation of any paper or document or claim, so long ashe does not hold himself out as practicing law or as being a me ber of the Bar." 393 U.S.
at 498 (concurring opinion). Justices White and Black, dissenting from the majoritys
view that the assistance of fellow inmates provides most prisoners with adequate ac-
cess to the courts, agreed with Justice Douglas "that it is neither practical nor necessar
to require the help of law)yers." 393 U.S. at 502 (dissenting opinion).
This broader definition of the right to counsel is also appropriate beca much 
coun-
seling takes place against a background of political or draft protest groups, whos 
activities
are shielded by the right of association. The right to counsel discussed here, like 
the right
to advocate litigation discussed infra, is a coth woven from both first and sixth amend.
ment threads. It should also be apparent that while much of the counseling dicused 
in
this Comment takes place on an individual, face-to-face basis, some of it is of 
a general
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and honest advice without fear of prosecution for giving registrants
the benefit of their beliefs about the draft law.
B. The Counselor's Right to Advocate Litigation
The registrant's right to effective counsel from the earliest stages
of his contact with the Selective Service System has a counterpart in
the counselor's right to advise and facilitate litigation by registrants
to seek redress of legal and political grievances against the draft. The
good faith belief defense defines the best standard by which to judge
the appropriateness of an assertion of a right to advocate litigation in
a particular case.
In a series of recent cases--NAA CP v. Button, Brotherhood of Rail-
way Trainmen, and United Mine Workersa 2-- the Supreme Court has
elucidated the right of people to organize for the purposes of advising
others to initiate law suits in vindication of apparent rights and aid-
ing them in prosecuting their suits. Though the core right to advise
litigation is grounded in the right of any person to instigate a law-
suit, the Court's formulation rests on a recognition of the relationship
between the design of the first amendment and the reasons for group
litigation. First, the Court has recognized the importance and special
appropriateness of the courts as an avenue for free communication.
The good faith draft counselor, like the NAACP in Button, seeks to
use the courts to make possible "the distinctive contribution of a
minority group to the ideals and beliefs of our society."ra His argu-
ments concerning the legality of the war in Vietnam and the draft raise
issues of compelling national importance. The use of the courts may
make his positions more widely acceptable 15 4
152. NAACP v. Button, 371 US. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 US. 1 (1964); United Mine Workers of America v. 11"
linois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
153. 371 U.S. at 431.
154. See also Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966,
988 (1967): "[F]ree speech performs a legitimating function. People who have been al-
lowed to participate freely in a discussion will be more willing to accept the ultimate d(e-
cision." The character of some of the current draft resistance (the burning of draft cards
and confrontations with the police) indicates that many Americans, believing that their
position has not received adequate attention from the government, have repudiated the
decisions of that government. During the Spock trial, Rev. Coffin explained the
comments he had made outside the Justice Department on October 20, 1967, to the
effect that in tendering a briefcase full of draft cards to an assistant attorney general lie
hoped to provoke a "legal confrontation with the proper agency of our government."
Spock Appendix 1638. He testified:
I meant by that very simply that if the government would refuse to have a good
court case on the legality of the war and the constitutionality of the draft law, then
out of frustration a great many people in America inevitably would begin to turn
from the politics of hope, if you will, to the politics of despair.
Id. 1639.
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In addition, "under the conditions of modern government, litigation
may well be the sole practical avenue open to a minority to petition
for redress of grievances."' While the Court in Button was concerned
with politically weak (and often disenfranchised) Southern blacks,
similar reasoning was relied on in United Mine Workers. It is clear,
therefore, that the possession of economic or political strength and
the possibility of pursuing grievances through other avenues do not
foreclose the use of the courts when a political viewpoint has a legal
counterpart.
The counseling of Selective Service registrants is perhaps the
paradigmatic political act to which the right to advocate litigation
should be applicable. The need to protect citizens' rights to free
speech and association seems more compelling in an area of general
national importance, such as the debate concerning Vietnam, than
where the particular economic interests of a relatively small group are
at issue. The Court in United Mine Workers held that the state could
not enforce laws which would not only weaken the economic rights of
the union members, but would seriously detract from the union's
ability to organize by preventing it from delivering to the workers
the benefits for which it had lobbied. 50 An organization's right to ad-
vocate and promote litigation is thus an inherent part of its right to
organize.15-
Justice Roberts's opinion in Keegan v. United States stressed the
evidence which showed defendants' good faith intention to bring a
"test case." That the registrant should find himself, at the counselor's
suggestion, in the posture of defendant rather than plaintiff (as in
the situations to which the right to litigate has recently been applied)
is not a difficulty of his ow~m making. It is Congress, in Section 10(b)(3),
which has determined that he can appear in court only as a defendant.
While the distinction may permit Congress to prohibit the counseling
155. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 429-30.
156. In encouraging vigorous and consistent litigation through its attorneys. the union
was attempting to protect the workmen's compensation scheme which it had persuaded
the state legislature to adopt. 389 U.S. at 219.
157. While the groups involved in Button and its siblings were undeniably more for-
mal associations than most draft counseling groups pretend to be. there is no legitimate
distinction between such advice and that provided by individuals or loose associations.
Nevertheless, since the most active groups of counselors-people with legal, moral or
political objections to the draft-are, in fact, often only infonnally organized. it might
be objected that they should raise their challenges directly as individuals rather than
through the registrants. As a practical matter such a course is virtually impossible since
the rules of standing alone would keep the counselor out of court. As a theoretical matter
the objection misses the point of the right to organize for litigation, which is to facilitate
free and effective expression of ideas and beliefs.
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of Selective Service violations where the counselor knows his objec-
tions are legally frivolous, any lesser standard than the good faith
belief defense would permit serious inroads upon the first amendment
right to organize around legal grievances enunciated in Button.158
VII. Conclusion
The good faith belief defense suggested here may be briefly stated:
a counselor may be convicted only if he knew that the conduct he
counseled was illegal-and that the law in question was not vulnerable
to court attack1'-or if he recklessly disregarded the illegality of the
counseled conduct. The recklessness limitation, however, must be kept
narrow if it is not to swallow the defense. Foolish but actual belief
in legality would be protected even if the counsel were not in the
form of a legal argument and were motivated by political or moral
considerations. 60 If the counsel were in any way oriented toward a
court test of the conduct's legality, the counselor should not be deemed
reckless. Only the counselor for whom testing legality is not important
and who merely hopes that the activity counseled is not illegal would
not be protected by the defense. He would have recklessly disregarded
the activity's probable illegality because he acted without intending to
secure a judicial vindication of the counseled conduct.'"'
When the good faith belief defense is raised, it need not, of course,
always be accepted. The context in which the claim is raised may give
the jury grounds to disbelieve the defendant. 10 2 A counselor who raises
158. The first amendment would, however, be a hollow promise if it left government
free to destroy or erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no law Is
passed that prohibits free speech, press, petition or assembly as such. We have there-
fore repeatedly held that laws which actually affect the exercise of these vital rights
cannot be sustained merely because they were enacted for the purpose of dealing
with some evil within the State's legislative competence, or even because the laws
do in fact provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil.
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
159. Whether some court in the hierarchy of appeals will strike down a particular
legal obligation is not, of course, always subject to certain knowledge. The knowledge
referred to in the text should therefore be taken to include the following notion from the
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962): "When knowledge of the
existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established If a
person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it
does not exist."
160. Cf. Dworkin, On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, June
6, 1968, at 14.
161. A motive test of this type would raise problems of proof, which would be initi-
gated by the evidence that the speech and its context would give. The test would give
body to the "actual belief" standard, whose hazards are discussed by Duke, Prosecutions
for Attempts to Evade Income Tax, 76 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1966).
162. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952).
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a belief about the counseled activity's legality for the first time at his
trial may be suspect for not having discussed it in his original counsel.
Similarly, a counselor who flies in the face of court decisions may
forfeit his claim to credibility.10 3 Although the grounds for his advice
need not be found to be "reasonable," evidence of their reasonable-
ness is relevant to the central issue, the counselor's actual beliefs.
163. None of the major claims of the antiwar protestors has been disposed of by the
Supreme Court, with the exception of the draft card mutilation requirement, upheld af-
ter the indictment of Dr. Spock and his co-defendants. United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S.
367 (1968). Some of the objections are: (1) Peacetime conscription is illegal, cf. Selective
Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); (2) The draft denies the individual the right not
to commit war crimes, cf. Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting from the denial of certiorari); (3) The war in Vietnam is illegal, as is. therefore.
compulsion to fight in it, cf. Mora v. McNamara. 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Stewart and Doug.
las, JJ., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); (4) The classification system denies equal
protection and establishes religion, see United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (W.D.
Mass. 1969). For a similar catalogue, see Griffiths, Book Review, 77 YALE LJ. 827
n.3 (1968).
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